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General introduction 
 
 
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis triggered by the US subprime mortgage crisis has 
had severe consequences on the stability of the financial system in many countries. The crisis 
has initiated discussions to search an alternative way to promote financial stability. Relying on 
Shariah principles, Islamic finance could be viewed as a complement to the traditional financial 
system because the complex speculative products and derivative instruments, at the source of 
the crisis, are prohibited in the Islamic system (Hassan and Aliyu, 2017; Imam and Kpodar, 
2016).  
Islamic finance has become a big industry worldwide. Islamic finance assets are indeed 
concentrated in the Middle East and a few Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC), but it 
has also expanded to beyond Muslim-majority countries such as Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Hussain and Turk-Ariss, 2015). The significant interest in Islamic finance has also 
emerged in the world’s leading conventional financial centers such as London, New York or 
Hong Kong, and Western investors now consider investing in Islamic financial products (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2013). The World Bank Islamic Banking Database  (2014) documents that 
around 400 institutions are offering Islamic financial services in more than 50 countries. In 
some countries, Islamic finance has become systemically important because such assets have 
exceeded 15% of total domestic financial industry (Islamic Financial Service Board, 2017). 
Islamic finance industry has rapidly grown during the last decade, up to nearly 20% annually 
(The Economist, 2014), mainly supported by the expansion of Islamic banks. In 2016, global 
Islamic banking assets are recorded as USD 1.493 trillion, and the sector continues to dominate 
the global Islamic finance industry, representing 78.9% of the industry’s assets (Islamic 
Financial Service Board, 2017).  
Among countries with the presence of Islamic financial institutions, only Iran and 
Sudan have adopted an entirely Shariah-compliant financial system. In the other countries, 
Islamic and conventional banks operate alongside in dual banking markets. The development 
of Islamic banking has led to an important literature investigating the potential differences 
between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of profitability, risk, business models, market 
structure and competition (see Abedifar et al. (2015), Hassan and Aliyu (2017), and Narayan 
and Phan (2017) for Islamic banking literature surveys). Differences between Islamic banks 
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and their conventional counterparts which mainly arise from the specificity of Islamic financial 
contracts and the role of Shariah board in Islamic bank governance and their impact on banks’ 
behaviors are at the core of this dissertation. 
A first strand of the literature has investigated the issue of risk and stability in dual 
markets and has provided mixed results. For some authors, small Islamic banks have lower 
credit risk and are more stable than conventional banks especially in the predominantly Muslim 
population (Abedifar et al., 2013). In a similar vein, Cihak and Hesse (2010) empirically find 
that small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than small conventional banks and large 
Islamic banks. Conversely, the empirical results of Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017) suggest that larger 
Islamic banks are more stable, particularly when they are very large. However, a recent finding 
from Doumpos et al. (2017) suggests that although conventional and Islamic banks might 
exhibit important differences in financial ratios, their overall financial strength is not 
significantly different. By examining the soundness of Islamic and conventional banks during 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) find no significant 
differences between them, whereas Abedifar et al. (2013) observe that Islamic banks are less 
stable than their conventional peers. 
 The presence of Islamic banks as a new entrant in the market could also affect 
conventional banks’ stability, with mixed results highlighted by some studies. Notwithstanding 
its relatively small size compared to the economy and overall financial system, it is empirically 
shown that the presence of Islamic banks can significantly boost the development of the 
banking sector as a whole (Gheeraert, 2014; Imam and Kpodar, 2016). Another research 
underlines that the presence of Islamic banks also positively impact economic welfare and 
financial deepening (Abedifar et al., 2016). Kabir and Worthington (2017) highlight that the 
presence of Islamic banks in the market increases the competitive pressure and therefore 
contributes to lower bank stability. Cihak and Hesse (2010) by looking at the Islamic banks' 
proportion in the dual banking market highlight that in the market with a higher share of Islamic 
banks, the soundness of Islamic banks is not altered. Such a finding suggests that both Islamic 
and conventional banks could compete in a similar market without threatening their stability. 
Market structure in dual banking systems has turned out to be an important issue to be 
investigated. If religious underpinnings for the provision of financial services do matter, one 
might argue that both types of banks do not compete with each other. As Muslims are known 
to be reluctant to use financial products which are not Shariah-compliant (Abedifar et al., 2013; 
Beck et al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013), they will favor the use of Shariah-compliant 
products provided by Islamic banks. Oppositely, non-Muslims consumers might be indifferent 
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between Islamic and conventional banks and might therefore choose banks based on 
performance considerations.  
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, we study in a more detailed perspective 
how dual market competition shapes the behavior of Islamic and conventional banks. 
Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions: Are Islamic banks more stable than 
their conventional peers? Is the stability of Islamic and conventional affected by the heightened 
competition in the dual market? Do Islamic and conventional banks behave differently, 
specifically when they set their deposit rates?   
A third chapter discusses the specificity of Islamic bank governance and its impact on 
equity financing. Whereas we might find difficulties in differentiating Islamic and conventional 
banks’ business model because both are indeed oriented to profit, the former had some 
characteristics that practically makes them different from the latter. From the governance 
perspective, Islamic banks not only have a board of directors (BOD) but also Shariah 
supervisory board (SSB). The additional governance system is expected to monitor Shariah 
practice in Islamic banks. Another characteristic that differentiates Islamic banks from their 
conventional peers is that Islamic banks have a mode of financing based on Islamic banks’ 
profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) principle. This mode of financing, widely known as equity 
financing, relying on risk sharing between the banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). 
We study how the existence of SSB in Islamic banks affect equity financing practices. This 
dissertation provides three chapter that will examine these issues.  
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates the competitiveness of Islamic and 
conventional banks in a dual market. Some studies show that Islamic banks have a higher 
market power than conventional banks (Hamza and Katchouli, 2014; Turk-Ariss, 2010) 
whereas other studies find that Islamic banks’ competitiveness is not higher than that of 
conventional ones (Weill, 2011). In our work, we go further than such studies because rather 
than investigating the market power of each bank type, we investigate how precisely Islamic 
and conventional banks compete in the dual market by analyzing their deposit pricing behavior. 
More particularly, our aim is to examine whether or not Islamic banks mimic their conventional 
rivals when they set their deposit rates. While Islamic and conventional banks are expected to 
behave differently, a large strand of literature documents that Islamic banks’ deposit rates are 
pegged to the rates of their conventional counterparts (Cevik and Charap, 2011; Chong and 
Liu, 2009; Ito, 2013; Saraç and Zeren, 2014). Hence, Islamic banks might be competing with 
conventional banks because they are adjusting their deposit rate of returns based on the 
conventional banks' market rate. Another study even finds that Islamic banks’ depositors are 
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more responsive than those of conventional ones especially when their deposit size is higher 
(Aysan et al., 2017). Our result reveals notable differences in the drivers of deposit rates in dual 
markets. As expected, conventional banks with lower market power set higher deposit rates but 
market power is not effective to explain the rates set by Islamic banks. We also show that in 
markets with a greater share of Islamic population or stronger presence of Islamic banks, 
conventional banks set higher deposit rates and even higher when their market power is lower. 
Such evidence suggests that religious beliefs matter in dual markets and that they may well 
shape economic behavior (Abedifar et al., 2016; Baele et al., 2014; Bursztyn et al., 2015; 
Farook et al., 2012). 
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates the competition-stability nexus in 
dual banking markets. This issue has become of major interest because prior empirical studies 
have mostly investigated competition and stability separately. Although the competition-
stability issue in Islamic banks has also been investigated by Kabir and Worthington (2017), 
we go further by taking a closer look at the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the role 
played by bank capital. Our finding in this chapter suggests that competition erodes bank 
stability, supporting the competition-fragility rather than the competition-stability nexus. 
Banks are encouraged to take more risk in a more competitive environment in dual banking 
markets, and this could jeopardize their financial stability. We also find in this chapter that the 
impact of competition is different for Islamic and conventional banks. Supporting the findings 
of our first chapter, Islamic banks’ stability is not affected by competition. Furthermore, we 
observe that different levels of competition differently impact conventional banks’ stability. 
Their stability significantly increases in less competitive markets and shrinks when competition 
is high. 
In the third chapter, we focus on Islamic banks by analyzing their equity financing. 
Although Islamic banks’ presence could encourage conventional banks to take a higher risk 
which might affect overall financial stability as we find in the two previous chapters, Islamic 
banks’ equity financing could have a positive impact on the development of small and medium 
enterprises. This is because from the entrepreneurs’ point of view, especially for those who just 
started a business, equity contracts can be more attractive than debt contracts (Khan, 1995). 
The equity contract is part of Islamic banks’ risk-sharing features. It is embedded in the PLS 
principle, that is the main principle of Islamic banks (Ibrahim and Alam, 2017) that makes 
them different from their conventional counterparts (Minhat and Dzolkarnaini, 2017). 
We further address what factors influence equity financing and also put more attention 
on the impact of Shariah supervisory board (SSB) characteristics. Differently from 
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conventional banks, Islamic banks have a two-layer governance system: board of directors 
(BOD) and SSB. While the former focuses on the bank’s performance, the latter focuses 
primarily on the Shariah practices within the banks and provides advice to Islamic banks in all 
Shariah-related matters including suggesting BOD and management to use more PLS-based 
transactions. Additionally, we also consider the impact of the institutional and Islamic 
environment because equity contracts, in theory, are easier to implement in a better contracting 
environment. Prior studies have highlighted that Islamic banks’ equity financing is rarely 
successful because the Islamic banking market is generally less transparent than in developed 
countries and more prone to rent-seeking behavior (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014; Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000; Alam and Parinduri, 2017; Dar and Presley, 2000). In line with our prediction, 
we find in this chapter that Islamic banks’ equity financing is affected by some characteristics 
of the SSB. The duality of SSB positively impacts the proportion of equity financing in Islamic 
banks whereas the presence of a Shariah department within Islamic banks negatively affects 
it. We also find that in a better banking environment, the impact of SSB is reduced.  
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several respects. First, our work is the 
first to investigate how Islamic and conventional banks compete for depositors in dual markets 
and to what extent specific competition features might shape their deposit-rate setting 
behaviors. Prior empirical works may have highlighted that Islamic banks’ deposit rates are 
pegged to those of conventional banks, but none of these studies has investigated the drivers 
of their deposit price setting. Our work has also shed light on the role of religiosity in the dual 
banking market competition. Second, our findings highlight a potential detrimental effect of 
dual market competition on Islamic and conventional banks’ stability. When the market is 
competitive, banks’ risk-taking behavior to attract more customers could affect their financial 
stability. However, the impact of competition on Islamic and conventional banks’ stability 
might be different. Higher competition is associated with lower bank stability, but this only 
applies to conventional banks; not to Islamic banks. Third, our study is also the first one to 
jointly investigate equity financing in Islamic banks and its relationship with SSB. Because of 
data limitations, prior studies in equity financing tend to essentially be theoretical. Moreover, 
most previous studies investigate equity financing and SSB separately.  
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Chapter 1 
Dual market competition and deposit rate setting in Islamic and 
conventional banks* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter addresses the issue of competition in dual banking markets by analyzing the 
determinants of deposit rates in Islamic and conventional banks. Using a sample of 20 countries 
with dual banking systems over the 2000-2014 period, our results show significant differences 
in the drivers of Islamic and conventional banks' pricing behavior. Conventional banks with 
stronger market power set lower deposit rates but market power is not significant for Islamic 
banks. In predominantly Muslim environments, conventional banks set higher deposit rates and 
further higher when their market power is lower. Whereas conventional banks are influenced 
by the competitiveness of Islamic banks, Islamic banks are only affected by their peers in 
predominantly Muslim countries.  Our findings have important implications regarding 
competition and bank stability in dual banking markets. 
 
Keywords: deposit rate, competition, dual banking market, Islamic and conventional banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
* This chapter draws from Meslier, C., Risfandy, T., Tarazi, A., 2017. Dual market competition and deposit rate 
setting in Islamic and conventional banks. Economic Modelling. Vol. 63, pp. 318–333. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2017.02.013  
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1. Introduction 
 
Islamic banking has substantially grown since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. 
Islamic banking assets grew at an annual rate of 17.6% between 2009 and 2012 and are 
expected to grow at almost 20% per year until 2018 (The Economist, 2014). Islamic banks' 
total assets have reached US$ 1.9 trillion in 2014 (Hussain and Turk-Ariss, 2015) and are 
expected to rise to US$2.6 trillion by 2017 (The Economist, 2013). While Islamic finance 
accounts for a relatively small fraction of global banking assets (less than 2%), it has sharply 
increased its penetration in several countries and exceeds the threshold of 15%1 of total banking 
system assets in at least 10 countries (Iran and Sudan with a full-fledged Islamic financial 
sector, Bangladesh, Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen) (Islamic Financial Service Board, 2015). Moreover, Islamic finance has expanded 
beyond Muslim countries, reaching Europe and Sub-Saharan regions. Islamic banks are present 
in Denmark, France, South Africa and the United Kingdom among others. How Islamic and 
conventional banks compete in such growing dual markets remains an insufficiently 
documented issue. In this work, we investigate how bank deposit rates are influenced by the 
concomitant presence of Islamic and conventional banks in an increasing number of countries.    
The development of Islamic banking has led to an important literature investigating the 
potential differences between Islamic and Conventional banks in terms of profitability, risk, 
business models, market structure and competition (see Abedifar et al. (2015) for a survey). 
Nevertheless, despite the growing presence of dual banking markets, where Islamic and 
conventional banks operate alongside, there is a scarce literature on the impact of dual banking 
market structure on Islamic and conventional banks' behavior. Moreover, the results of such 
studies are often mixed. While Turk-Ariss (2010b) finds that Islamic banks are less competitive 
than their conventional counterparts, Weill (2011) does not find significant market power 
differences between both types of banks, in contradiction with the view that Islamic banks may 
benefit from captive customers. Other papers look at the macroeconomic and social 
implications of further penetration of Islamic banks in the financial system as a whole. 
Gheeraert (2014) shows that the presence of Islamic banking in Muslim countries can boost 
banking sector development. Abedifar et al. (2016) highlight a positive impact of the market 
share of Islamic banks on financial deepening and economic welfare. They also find a positive 
                                                     
1 The Islamic Financial Stability Board (IFSB) considers the Islamic financial sector as systemically important 
when the total Islamic banking assets account for more than 15% of the total domestic banking sector assets. 
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relationship between the presence of large Islamic banks and the efficiency of conventional 
banks in predominantly Muslim countries. Čihák and Hesse (2010) further highlight that a 
higher market share of Islamic banks does not alter the soundness of the other banks in a given 
country, suggesting that both types of banks could compete on the same market without 
jeopardizing financial stability.  
In this work, we question how bank competition in dual markets affects the deposit rate 
setting behavior of Islamic and conventional banks, an issue which is of great importance from 
both a market structure perspective and a financial stability perspective. Focusing on 
differences in deposit rate setting in dual markets is of particular interest due to the specific 
nature of Islamic banks’ depositors. Islamic banks follow the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) 
principle. Transposed to banks this principle implies that profits and losses have to be shared 
between the borrowers and the bank and then between the bank and the depositors. Hence, the 
bank-depositor relationship in Islamic banking is not debt-based as in conventional banks. 
Islamic depositors are considered as “quasi-shareholder” and participate in bank funding 
through equity-based contracts, where Islamic depositors act as a source of funds and banks as 
a fund manager. Islamic depositors cannot claim a fixed rate of return on their deposits, a rate 
which will in fact depend on the bank's actual ex post profit. While Islamic banks and 
conventional banks are expected to set their deposit rates differently, empirical research does 
not report significant differences in their pricing behavior. Chong and Liu (2009) and Ito (2013) 
provide strong evidence that the deposit rates of Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia 
are closely pegged. Investigating the deposit rates of conventional and Islamic banks in 
Malaysia and Turkey, Charap and Cevik (2011) show that conventional banks' deposit rates 
and PLS returns are cointegrated. Moreover, the authors find that conventional banks' deposit 
rates Granger cause returns on PLS accounts. Saraç and Zeren (2014) confirm such results and 
highlight a strong dependency between the deposit rates of Islamic and conventional banks in 
Turkey. Moreover, they also find evidence of bi-directional causality thereby highlighting more 
complex interactions between both types of banks than in earlier studies. While these papers 
provide statistical evidence of a co-evolution of deposit rates of Islamic and conventional 
banks, they do not investigate the determinants of deposit rates per se and to what extent they 
actually differ between both types of banks.  
For the purpose of our study, we consider a sample of 98 Islamic and 386 conventional 
banks from 20 Muslim and non-Muslim countries where Islamic and conventional banks 
operate alongside. We first examine the determinants of deposit rates for each type of banks 
with a specific focus on the role played by market power. We analyze how both types of banks 
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set deposit rates depending on the degree of their market power in possibly segmented markets 
(i.e. where Islamic and conventional banks compete for different depositors) or in integrated 
markets (i.e. where Islamic and conventional banks compete for the same depositors). On the 
one hand, one might argue that both types of banks do not compete with each other and that a 
depositor switching from a depository institution is more likely to go to a similar type of 
depository institution (Adams et al., 2007; Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007). In theory, the equity-
based deposit accounts offered by Islamic banks should be very different from the debt-based 
deposit accounts of conventional banks. Moreover, Muslims are known to be reluctant to use 
conventional banks financial products which are not Sharia-compliant (Abedifar et al., 2016; 
Beck et al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). In a segmented market, banks should be only 
influenced by the market conditions of their own segment.  On the other hand, because some 
studies find that Islamic and conventional banks’ deposit rates are closely pegged, one might 
consider that those banks compete in integrated markets with the same depositors. 
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that while religiosity might prevent depositors from 
Islamic banks to switch to conventional banks, Islamic banks could well attract depositors of 
conventional banks if they offer higher expected returns. We hence also examine the case of a 
one way/asymmetric competition where conventional banks are influenced by Islamic banks 
but not the other way round. In such a situation, conventional banks would be competing with 
both categories of banks, conventional and Islamic banks. We further investigate how Islamic 
and conventional banks react to stronger presence of Islamic banks and Muslim population. 
While these factors might not influence bank behavior in segmented markets, the behavior of 
both Islamic and conventional banks can be influenced by the importance of Muslim population 
and the presence of Islamic banks.   
Our findings reveal notable differences in the drivers of deposit rates of Islamic banks 
and conventional banks. As expected, conventional banks with stronger market power set lower 
deposit rates but market power is not effective for Islamic banks. Moreover, conventional banks 
are influenced by the market conditions prevailing on the Islamic segment whereas Islamic 
banks are indifferent to the market structure of the conventional segment. We also find that 
stronger presence of Islamic banks and higher share of Islamic population are associated with 
higher deposit rates for conventional banks. Moreover, in countries with either a strong 
presence of Islamic banks or a high proportion of Muslim population, conventional banks set 
higher deposit rates which are even higher for the least competitive ones. Our results support 
previous findings (Abedifar et al., 2016; Baele et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2012)  indicating that 
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religious beliefs matter in dual markets and that they may well shape economic behavior 
(Bursztyn et al., 2015). 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, our chapter complements the existing 
literature on bank market structure. For instance, following the deregulation process which 
occurred during the 2000s in the U.S., numerous studies have investigated how U.S. banks of 
different type, size or scope compete together. Biehl, (2002), Hannan and Prager (2004), Rosen 
(2007) highlight significant differences, in deposit price behavior, between multimarket and 
single market banks, with significantly lower deposit rates at multi-market banks. Moreover, 
these studies also highlight a strong influence of both local market concentration and presence 
of multimarket banks on the pricing behavior of single-market banks. However, Hannan and 
Prager (2004) highlight that single market banks’ deposit price setting behavior is influenced 
by the market share of multimarket banks in local markets. Adams et al. (2007) findings’ 
support the presence of market segmentation among different types of depository institutions 
(banks versus thrifts institutions). This limited competition both between single-market and 
multimarket banks and between thrifts and banks is confirmed by Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), 
indicating significant differences in consumer preferences for banking products. Among the 
different factors which might influence individual financial choices, many authors stress the 
importance of morality and religious belief (Bursztyn et al., 2015; Khan, 2010). Our chapter 
brings a novel dimension to the existing literature on bank market structure by investigating 
the influence of religious belief in banking competition. Despite an abundant literature 
concluding that Islamic banks mimic conventional banks behaviors, these papers do not 
provide an analysis of the drivers of Islamic and conventional banks pricing behavior.  To the 
best of our knowledge, our work is the first to investigate if and how Islamic and conventional 
banks compete in dual markets and to what extent specific competition features might shape 
their behaviors. We show that even though prior literature has highlighted that Islamic banks 
mimic conventional banks when they set their interest rates (Charap and Cevik, 2015; Chong 
and Liu, 2009; Ito, 2013; Saraç and Zeren, 2014), the determinants of such rates are very 
different. 
Second, this work also contributes to the debate on financial stability in dual markets. 
Increased competition can be detrimental for financial stability and among others, Hellman et 
al. (2000) theoretically show that deposit-rate ceilings can be necessary to prevent banks from 
competing through inefficiently high deposit rates possibly leading to destructive competition. 
We bring the issue of competition-stability nexus specifically in the dual market, an important 
issue that has rarely been addressed in the recent Islamic banking literature. The extent to which 
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Islamic banking development leads to more or less financial stability remains an open question. 
On the one hand, some papers highlight the benefits of Islamic banking development for the 
stability of the financial system through lower default rates on small business Islamic loans 
(Baele et al., 2014), better asset quality and capitalization (Beck et al., 2013), lower default risk 
of small Islamic banks (Abedifar et al., 2013; Cihak and Hesse, 2010), more counter-cyclical 
behavior of Islamic banks in the loan market (Ibrahim, 2016) or lower failure rate (Pappas et 
al., 2014). On the other hand, other papers find large Islamic banks to be less stable (Cihak and 
Hesse, 2010) and less diversified and less hedged (Beck et al., 2013) than large conventional 
banks highlighting potential instability sources. By providing evidence that conventional banks 
set higher rates to attract depositors in reaction to higher competitiveness of the Islamic 
segment, our study highlights potential detrimental effects of competition, in terms of financial 
stability, in dual markets. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, the 
methodology, and the descriptive statistics of our variables. Section 3 reports the empirical 
results and section 4 provides some further investigations and robustness tests. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Method and data 
 
2.1. Econometric model 
In order to investigate the determinants of deposit rates of Islamic and conventional 
banks, we base our investigation on a similar baseline model than the one used in previous 
studies (Hannan and Prager, 2004; Rosen, 2007) and adopt the following econometric 
specification: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.    (1) 
 
where the i, j and t subscripts refer to the individual bank, country and time dimensions 
respectively. αi and αt are respectively the individual/bank effects and time-specific effects. 
Deposit rate is our dependent variable2. We calculate for each Islamic and conventional 
bank the implicit deposit rate by considering the ratio of total interest expense on customer 
                                                     
2 As noted by an anonymous referee, there are different types of deposit contracts in Islamic banks and some 
depositors do not share the profits and losses with the bank. For instance in wadiah contracts the depositor deposits 
his funds or assets with the bank for safekeeping and in most of the agreements the bank charges a fee for the safe 
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deposits to total customer deposits3. This proxy has been widely used in the literature to analyze 
deposit rate setting behavior (Hannan and Prager, 2004; Rosen, 2007). It is also the proxy which 
is commonly used in the deposit insurance and market discipline literature (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2004; Hori et al., 2009; Imai, 2006; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; 
Murata and Hori, 2006). In line with the structure-performance hypothesis, a substantial 
literature documents that banks set a lower deposit rate in a more concentrated market (Berger 
and Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Nys et al., 2015; Rosen, 2007). Furthermore, we 
expect banks with higher market power to set a lower deposit rate. 
To measure market power, we use the Lerner index (Lerner) commonly used in the 
bank competition literature (Berger et al., 2009; Love and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2015; 
Turk-Ariss, 2010b; Weill, 2011). The Lerner index is defined as the markup pricing of banking 
products over marginal cost. We follow previous literature (Berger et al., 2009; Love and Maria 
Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2015; Turk-Ariss, 2010b; Weill, 2011) and use a three input cost 
function specification to estimate marginal cost (See Appendix A for a more detailed 
presentation of the computation of the Lerner index). The coefficient β1 is expected to be 
negative, indicating that banks with lower market power will set higher rates to attract 
depositors. 
  In order to measure the degree of competition at the country level, we construct the 
following three country-level Lerner indexes: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝐼𝐵,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝐶𝐵,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
                                                     
custody of the depositor’s funds. Ideally, estimations excluding this type of deposits should be conducted at least 
for robustness considerations. However, data limitations in Bankscope do not allow us to make a distinction 
between PLS deposits and other type of deposits. This is unfortunately a drawback of all cross-country papers on 
Islamic banking but also on conventional banks where actual rates need to be proxied by implicit rates drawn from 
income statements and balance sheets. 
3 For Islamic banks, the term “deposit return” might be more appropriate than “deposit rate” because Islamic 
banks do not pay interests to their depositors (see Farook et al. (2012)). However, in the rest of the chapter, we 
use the term “deposit rate” for both Islamic and conventional banks. 
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LernerIBjt and LernerCBjt are computed as the weighted average of the individual 
Lerner indexes of respectively, the Islamic banks and the conventional banks operating in 
country j at time t. These two indexes (LernerIBjt and LernerCBjt) measure the degree of 
competition in the Islamic and conventional banking segments respectively. We also compute 
a measure of competition at the country-industry level, LernerMKTjt, as the weighted average 
of the individual Lerner indexes of all banks (both Islamic and conventional banks) operating 
in country j at time t. The latter measures the degree of market competition for the whole 
banking market (including both Islamic and conventional banks). Whereas some authors rely 
on an simple unweighted average of individual Lerner indexes (Love and Martinez-Peria, 
2015), we follow Leon (2015) and use a weighted average to take into account the relative 
market share of each Islamic or conventional bank either in their own market segment (Islamic 
or conventional banks) or in the whole market (Islamic and conventional banks). 
As highlighted by previous studies on Islamic banking, religious beliefs might have a 
significant influence on individual decisions, leading Muslim consumers to avoid banking 
products which are not Sharia-compliant and stay away from conventional banks (Kumru and 
Sarntisart, 2016). Beck et al. (2013) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2013) find evidence that 
Muslims are less willing than non-Muslims to own formal accounts or to save their money at 
a formal financial institution. Islamic depositors might also be more loyal towards Islamic 
banks (Abedifar et al., 2016). In countries with a stronger Islamic presence, we expect that 
conventional banks will face more difficulties to attract consumers, especially the religious 
ones. Moreover, this effect might be stronger for banks having a lower market power.  
In order to investigate the impact of stronger Islamic presence (Islamic presencej) on 
the deposit rate/competition nexus, we extend our baseline specification as follows:  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡   
∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.    (2) 
 
where Islamic presence is either (HighMPOPj) or (HighShareIBjt).  
We use two different measures to capture the extent of Islamic presence. We follow 
Abedifar et al. (2016) and use the proportion of Muslim population in country j (MPOPj). We 
also use the market share of Islamic banks in country j at time t (ShareIBjt) to investigate 
whether differences in Islamic bank presence might impact Islamic and conventional banks’ 
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deposit rate setting behavior. We construct two dummy variables (HighMPOPj and 
HighShareIBjt) that take the value of one if the share of Muslim population in country j 
(MPOPj) and the market share of Islamic banks in country j at time t (ShareIBjt) respectively 
are above the sample mean and zero otherwise. 
The impact of Lerner on the deposit rate is given by (β1) in countries with a low level 
of Islamic presence and by (β1+β3) in countries with a high level of Islamic presence. Moreover, 
we also compute the impact of Islamic presence on deposit rate. Computed for different values 
of the Lerner index, this effect is given by (β2+β3*Lernerith) where Lernerith is the value of the 
Lerner index at either the 25th, the 50th or the 75th percentile.  
We then consider which behavior would be consistent in either segmented or integrated 
market as well as markets with asymmetric competition. In segmented markets, conventional 
and Islamic banks would compete in separate markets for distinct consumers. Islamic banks 
would presumably set deposit rates according to the PLS principle, regardless of the importance 
of Muslim population or of the market share of Islamic banks in the country. Conventional 
banks behavior should not be altered by stronger presence of Islamic population, as 
conventional banks do not expect to attract this type of customers.   
 On the contrary, in integrated markets, where Islamic and conventional banks compete 
alongside for the same consumers, a higher percentage of Muslim population may lead Islamic 
and conventional banks to set higher deposit rates (β2 positive and significant)4. Moreover, in 
countries where the market share of Islamic banks is relatively high, it might be more difficult 
for conventional banks to attract depositors, leading them to increase their deposit rate. 
Whether Islamic banks set higher/lower rates or even actually react in such an environment is 
unclear. Moreover, we expect the impact of stronger Islamic presence to be stronger for banks 
having lower market power (β3 negative). In order to attract depositors in more religious 
environments or in countries with a stronger presence of Islamic banks, low market power 
banks will need to set higher deposit rates. Eventually, in presence of asymmetric competition, 
Islamic banks would be insensitive to conventional banks' market power but the opposite would 
not be true. To prevent customers from fleeing to Islamic banks, in some circumstances 
conventional banks might need to adjust their deposit rates upwards (β3 negative).  
We also control for a large set of bank-level (Xit) characteristics. These variables are 
included with a one-year lag. We use the bank’s return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for the PLS 
                                                     
4 If Islamic and conventional banks are not viewed as very different institutions  (Beck et al., 2013; Charap and 
Cevik, 2015; Chong and Liu, 2009; Saraç and Zeren, 2014), Islamic banks are expected to follow conventional 
banks in increasing their deposit rates to attract customers.  
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principle5. Indeed, depositors in Islamic banks are investment account holders and they are 
considered as bank “quasi-shareholders”. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between the 
return on equity and the return provided to Islamic banks’ investment account holders. For 
conventional banks, ROE might also be considered as a proxy for profitability. We expect 
higher profitability to reduce default risk and hence enable banks to set a lower deposit rate. A 
higher ROE may therefore also be associated with a lower deposit rate (Martinez-Peria and 
Schmukler, 2001). We control for different dimensions of bank risk using the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (Liquidity) as a measure of liquidity risk, the ratio of loan loss reserve to 
total loan (LLR) to proxy credit risk and the capital ratio (Equity) to proxy default risk. Highly 
risky banks are expected to increase their deposit rates to attract customers (Acharya and Mora, 
2015; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). We also control for bank size using the logarithm 
of total assets (Size). Even though large and small banks might set different rates there's no 
clear-cut expected relationship (Rosen, 2007). Larger banks might offer higher rates to their 
customers because they have better investment options. However, they may also offer lower 
rates because they have alternative sources of funding. Listed banks are also captured by a 
dummy variable (Listed) which takes the value of one is the bank is listed and zero otherwise. 
Listed banks, which have an easier access to market funding, may be less reliant on deposits 
and may set lower rates than privately-owned banks (Nys et al., 2015).  
We also include in our regressions a set of country-level variables (Zjt). We control for 
banking market structure using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), computed as the sum 
of the squared values of each bank’s market share (both IBs and CBs) in the overall market. 
Computation of bank market share relies on banks’ deposits. The value of this index lies 
between 0 and 1. A greater value of this index indicates a more concentrated market, which 
may lead banks to offer a lower deposit rate (Nys et al., 2015; Rosen, 2007). Finally, we control 
for macroeconomic conditions using the inflation rate (Inflation) and the growth of GDP 
(GGDP). Table B1 (appendix B) provides a description of all the variables used in this study. 
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) on two distinct sub-samples, Islamic banks and 
conventional banks.  Equation 1 is estimated using the fixed effect estimator with standard 
errors clustered at the bank level. For Equation 2, we rely either on the fixed-effect estimator 
                                                     
5 As noted by an anonymous referee, in practice, the share of profit distributed to investment account holders is 
drawn from different types of reserves like the profit equalization reserves (PER) and the investment risk reserve 
(IRR). Hence ROE might not be a sufficient and accurate measure. Unfortunately, data on PER and IRR are not 
available. While such information could be collected from the banks’ annual reports, only few Islamic banks 
publish PER and IRR information. Therefore, we use a standard accounting measure such as ROE to proxy PLS. 
Although this is not a perfect measure it is strongly correlated with the return on investment accounts (Aysan et 
al., 2015). 
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(when HighShareIB is used as a proxy of Islamic presence) or on the Hausman-Taylor 
estimator (when HighMPOP is used as a proxy of Islamic presence)6. Indeed, as the variable 
HighMPOP is time-invariant, we cannot use the fixed-effect estimator. While switching to the 
random effect (RE) estimator might allow us to identify all the coefficients of our equations, 
the Hausman test indicates that the RE estimator might be inconsistent. We hence use 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator. The HT estimation requires the partition of the variables into 
endogeneous and exogeneous variables. We follow Baltagi (2005), Baltagi et al. (2003), and 
Bouvatier (2014) and use the the Hausman test (FE vs. HT) for the choice of endogenous 
variables. We choose the combination which maximizes the p-value of the Hausman test (FE 
vs. HT). 
 
2.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on bank-level and country-level data for a sample of 
Islamic and conventional banks from countries with dual banking systems over the 2000-2014 
period. Our bank-level data come from the Bankscope database. We use consolidated data 
when available and otherwise unconsolidated data. In order to deal with Islamic banking 
misclassification issues in the Bankscope database (Abedifar et al., 2013; Cihak and Hesse, 
2010; Gheeraert, 2014), we also refer to the World Bank database of Islamic banking 7 . 
However, as the World Bank database covers not only Islamic commercial banks but also 
Islamic investment banks, we also check each Islamic bank’s website and drop purely Islamic 
investment banks having no customer deposits. We winsorize our main variables at the 1% and 
99% level. Our final sample includes of 2,869 observations for a set of 98 Islamic and 386 
conventional banks from 20 Muslim and non-Muslim countries 8 . Table 1 presents some 
country-level information for our sample of countries. Our country-level data come from 
different sources. We collect GDP growth data and inflation rates from the World Bank website 
and the percentage of the Muslim population comes from The World Factbook. 
 
 
                                                     
6 Mixed effect/multilevel methodology could be an alternative way to solve the issue raised by time-invariant 
variables. This approach could allow us to model varying coefficients (intercept and slope) across two groups 
(countries with a high level of Muslim population (HighMPOP=1) and countries with a low level of Muslim 
population (HighMPOP=0). However, as discussed in Gelman and Hill (2007), when the number of groups is 
small (less than 5), there is not enough information to accurately estimate group-level variation. Despite this 
limitation, we run the estimations using this methodology, leaving our main results unchanged. 
7 The database is available here: http://go.worldbank.org/AE0U8AYQ20 
8 Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Yemen. 
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Table B1. Summary of the variable definition 
 Variables description Source 
Bank-level variables  
Deposit rateit The ratio of total interest expense on deposits to consumer deposits. Bankscope 
Lernerit Bank-level Lerner index.  Bankscope 
ROEit The ratio of equity to total assets. Bankscope 
Liquidityit The ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Bankscope 
ROAit The ratio of net income to total assets. Bankscope 
Equityit The ratio of equity capital to total asset. Bankscope 
Sizeit The logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
LLRit The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Bankscope 
Listed 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank is listed and 
zero otherwise 
Bankscope 
Country-level variables  
LernerIBjt 
The weighted average of the individual Lerner indexes of Islamic banks 
in country j at time t. 
Bankscope 
LernerCBjt  
The weighted average of the individual Lerner indexes of conventional 
banks in country j at time t. 
Bankscope 
LernerMKTjt  
The weighted average of the individual Lerner indexes of all banks (both 
Islamic and conventional banks) operating in country j at time t. 
Bankscope 
ShareIBjt 
Market share of Islamic banks (in terms of total deposits) in country j at 
time t. 
Bankscope 
HighShareIBjt 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the value of ShareIBjt 
is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. 
Bankscope 
MPOPj Proportion of Muslims in country j. 
The World 
Factbook 
HighMPOPj 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the value of MPOPj  is 
above the sample mean and zero otherwise 
World 
Factbook 
Inflationjt Rate of inflation 
The World 
Bank. 
GGDPjt GDP growth 
The World 
Bank. 
HHIjt 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration 
in country j at date t:  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1⁄ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1 .  
The value ranges between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate that the 
market is more concentrated. 
Bankscope 
Interest ratesjt Short-term interest rate 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IMF) 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of our bank-level variables for the whole sample 
of banks and reports the results of mean tests between Islamic and conventional banks sub-
samples. Islamic banks’ deposit rates are significantly lower than those of conventional banks. 
This finding is in line with the results of Aysan et al. (2016) who observe that Turkish Islamic 
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banks pay lower deposit rates than their conventional counterparts. Consistent with Weill 
(2011), we do not find significant differences for the Lerner indexes, meaning that, on average, 
the market power of Islamic banks and conventional banks are not different. 
Conventional banks in our sample are larger (Size) than Islamic banks. Moreover, as 
highlighted in the literature (e.g., Abedifar et al.(2013); Beck et al. (2013)), Islamic banks are 
better capitalized (Equity) than conventional banks.  
Turning to country-level variables, the average market share of Islamic banks (ShareIB) is 
18.3% and the average value of Muslim population (MPOP) is 76.7%. The mean value of HHI 
is 0.19.  
 
Table 1. Banking sector structure in sample countries 
 
Country IB CB 
ShareIB 
(%) 
MPOP 
(%) 
Lerner 
IB 
Lerner 
CB 
Lerner 
MKT Inflation GGDP HHI 
Bahrain 6 9 20.80 70.30 0.230 0.248 0.239 0.066 -0.002 0.188 
Bangladesh 7 33 16.39 89.50 0.195 0.164 0.171 0.059 0.043 0.114 
Egypt 3 21 6.53 90.00 0.139 0.118 0.119 0.088 0.022 0.149 
Indonesia 7 66 1.30 87.20 0.139 0.261 0.259 0.105 0.040 0.102 
Iraq 1 5 24.30 99.00 0.311 0.260 0.261 0.116 0.023 0.361 
Jordan 3 10 7.52 97.20 0.246 0.271 0.270 0.050 0.029 0.389 
Kenya 2 30 0.80 11.10 0.063 0.309 0.308 0.080 0.017 0.117 
Kuwait 5 5 39.02 76.70 0.325 0.491 0.426 0.082 -0.002 0.193 
Malaysia 19 28 12.68 61.30 0.190 0.309 0.300 0.036 0.033 0.093 
Mauritania 1 3 14.09 100.00 0.337 0.264 0.254 0.069 0.020 0.191 
Pakistan 9 23 14.70 96.40 0.254 0.220 0.224 0.110 0.020 0.151 
Qatar 5 6 16.05 77.50 0.533 0.464 0.472 0.080 0.016 0.279 
Saudi Arabia 5 7 38.41 99.00 0.463 0.524 0.500 0.058 0.025 0.116 
South Africa 1 16 0.14 1.50 0.086 0.205 0.205 0.072 0.016 0.298 
Sudan 4 1 72.06 99.00 0.159 0.239 0.216 0.148 0.040 0.335 
Tunisia 1 10 6.96 99.10 0.262 0.280 0.288 0.036 0.026 0.149 
Turkey 4 26 4.27 99.80 0.199 0.099 0.100 0.167 0.030 0.167 
United Arab 
Emirates 10 17 17.35 76.00 0.322 0.456 0.433 0.065 -0.028 0.102 
United 
Kingdom 3 66 0.01 4.40 -0.552 0.211 0.211 0.023 0.012 0.127 
Yemen 2 4 28.04 99.10 0.325 0.337 0.213 0.119 -0.002 0.268 
Total 98 386         
Average     18.27 76.71 0.231 0.291 0.278 0.082 0.019 0.194 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 All sample Islamic banks Conventional banks Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
 
Deposit 
rate 2,869 0.042 0.034 0.000 0.245 525 0.038 0.035 2,344 0.042 0.033 -2.482** 
Lerner 2,779 0.252 0.215 -0.751 0.694 499 0.245 0.251 2,280 0.254 0.207 -0.845 
ROE 2,869 0.100 0.137 -0.702 0.535 525 0.091 0.130 2,344 0.102 0.138 -1.668 
Liquidity 2,868 0.246 0.159 0.060 0.790 525 0.240 0.143 2,343 0.247 0.162 -0.914 
LLR 2,841 0.051 0.065 0.001 0.460 518 0.050 0.072 2,323 0.051 0.064 -0.314 
Equity 2,869 0.124 0.070 0.037 0.501 525 0.137 0.090 2,344 0.121 0.064 4.769*** 
Size 2,869 22,400 67,400 16.361 436,000 525 7,752 14,200 2,344 25,700 73,900 -5.541*** 
Listed 2,869 0.646 0.478 0.000 1.000 525 0.604 0.490 2,344 0.655 0.476 -2.207*** 
Note: The last column reports t-statistics of mean equality test between Islamic and conventional banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1. Baseline regression 
Table 3 displays the estimation results for Equation (1) over our two sub-samples of 
banks. Results are reported in columns (1) to (3) for the Islamic banks sub-sample and in 
columns (4) to (6) for the conventional banks sub-sample. As the correlation matrixes (Table 
B2 and B3 in Appendix B) indicate a significant correlation between our measure of bank 
market power (Lerner) and our PLS proxy (ROE) on both sub-samples, we first introduce 
Lerner and ROE separately (columns (1) and (2) for the Islamic banks sub-sample and columns 
(4) and (5) for the conventional banks sub-sample respectively). Columns (3) and (6) report the 
estimation results when simultaneously including Lerner and ROE for the Islamic and 
conventional banks sub-samples respectively. 
Our results show notable differences in the drivers of deposit rates in Islamic and 
conventional banks and specifically regarding the effect of bank market power. While higher 
market power (higher value of Lerner) leads conventional banks to set lower deposit interest 
rates, this variable is not significant for Islamic banks. In other words, contrary to conventional 
banks, Islamic banks, who might benefit from a captive clientele, do not set lower deposit rates 
when gaining market power. This result is consistent with the view that Islamic banks' behavior 
is shaped by the moral obligation to set a fair price to their customers, possibly limiting their 
willingness to set lower prices. This result is also in line with the findings of Mollah and Zaman 
(2015) and Mollah et al. (2016) who highlight that the governance structure of Islamic banks 
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with the presence of a Shari’ah supervisory board might play a significant role in Islamic bank 
behavior. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Islamic and conventional banks’ deposit rate setting behavior 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (1) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to 
(3)) and conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)):   
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
See Table B1 for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lerner 0.0142  0.0118 -0.0371***  -0.0386*** 
 (0.75)  (0.60) (-5.34)  (-5.48) 
ROE  0.0280** 0.0219*  0.000201 0.00763 
  (2.07) (1.67)  (0.04) (1.49) 
Liquidity -0.00232 0.00352 -0.0000320 -0.0139* -0.0147* -0.0140* 
 (-0.16) (0.27) (-0.00) (-1.81) (-1.78) (-1.84) 
LLR 0.108 0.132** 0.117* -0.0329* -0.0271 -0.0288 
 (1.65) (2.21) (1.73) (-1.86) (-1.54) (-1.62) 
Equity 0.0659 0.0601 0.0634 -0.00994 -0.0192 -0.0119 
 (1.37) (1.35) (1.37) (-0.34) (-0.61) (-0.40) 
Size 0.0152** 0.0127** 0.0132** 0.00988*** 0.0100*** 0.00963*** 
 (2.34) (2.00) (2.07) (4.63) (4.18) (4.48) 
Listed 0.00683 0.00232 0.0437*** 0.0533*** 0.0568*** 0.0523*** 
 (1.63) (0.76) (2.75) (7.35) (7.95) (7.03) 
Inflation 0.0303* 0.0155 0.0293* 0.0168*** 0.0161** 0.0166*** 
 (1.88) (0.91) (1.78) (3.10) (2.43) (3.06) 
HHI 0.0887 0.0945 0.0921 -0.0443* -0.0241 -0.0447** 
 (1.22) (1.25) (1.25) (-1.95) (-0.84) (-1.99) 
GGDP -0.00714 -0.00155 -0.00940 -0.0198 -0.0279** -0.0210* 
 (-0.31) (-0.07) (-0.41) (-1.63) (-2.13) (-1.71) 
Constant -0.231** -0.188* -0.197* -0.0963*** -0.109*** -0.0924*** 
 (-2.04) (-1.74) (-1.82) (-2.77) (-2.85) (-2.64) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 500 525 499 2281 2344 2280 
N Banks. 96 98 96 380 386 380 
R-Squared 0.240 0.229 0.247 0.310 0.249 0.311 
 
We also find a negative relationship between the deposit rate and liquidity risk for 
conventional banks, indicating that conventional banks set lower deposit rates when they are 
more liquid, although at the 10% significance level only. This result is consistent with previous 
findings (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Nys et al., 2015). However, we do not find any 
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significant impact for Islamic banks. A positive relationship is obtained between the deposit 
rate and credit risk for Islamic banks, indicating that more risky banks set higher rates. 
Consistent with Nys et al. (2015), larger banks and listed banks set a higher deposit rate a result 
which holds for both Islamic and conventional banks in our sample. As expected, we find a 
positive and significant effect of our PLS proxy (ROE) on the deposit rates of Islamic banks, 
although at the 10% significance level only. Higher return to shareholders leads to an increase 
in the return provided to depositors. Finally, while inflation has a significant impact on deposit 
rates for conventional banks, regarding Islamic banks the coefficient is only significant at the 
10% level.  
All in all, while previous studies (e.g. Charap and Cevik (2011), Chong and Liu (2009), 
Saraç and Zeren (2014)) argue that the correlation between deposit rates of conventional and 
Islamic banks indicate that both types of finance do no significantly differ, our results provide 
evidence of significant differences in the way Islamic and conventional banks set their deposit 
rate.  
 
3.2. Deposit rate, market power, and Islamic presence 
 We further investigate in this section whether the pricing behavior of Islamic and 
conventional banks is altered by the importance of Islamic presence, measured either by the 
share of Muslims in the population or by the market share of Islamic banks. Table 4A presents 
the estimation results of Equation (2) using alternatively HighShareIBjt (columns (1) and (3)) 
and HighMPOPj (columns (2) and (4)) as a measure of Islamic presence. Table 4B provides 
the impact of Lerner when Islamic presence is high (using alternatively HighShareIBjt 
(columns (1) and (3)) and HighMPOPj (columns (2) and (4)) and the impact of Islamic presence 
(using alternatively HighShareIBjt (columns (1) and (3)) and HighMPOPj (columns (2) and (4)) 
computed at different value of Lerner. 
Our findings highlight significant differences in the impact of Islamic presence on 
deposit rates for Islamic and conventional banks. While higher market share of Islamic banks 
leads to an increase in deposit rates for both types of banks, higher share of Muslim population 
only impacts conventional banks' pricing behavior. In countries with a predominant Muslim 
population, conventional banks set higher deposit rates than in countries with a lower 
proportion of Muslim population, while Islamic banks' pricing behavior is not impacted. This 
result suggests that conventional banks might face strong difficulties to attract depositors in 
more religious environments. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term (Lerner x 
Islamic presence) is negative and significant, indicating that the impact of Islamic presence 
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(using both HighShareIBjt and HighMPOPj) is stronger for conventional banks with lower 
market power. In countries with a predominant Muslim population or with a strong presence 
of Islamic banks, conventional banks set a higher deposit rate and even higher when their 
market power is lower.  
Nevertheless, while our findings suggest that stronger market power allows Islamic 
banks to set higher deposit rates in countries where Islamic banks' market share is low (β1 is 
positive and significant), we do not find any significant impact in countries where the market 
share of Islamic banks is high ((β1+β3) is not statistically significant). 
Our results so far suggest significant differences in Islamic and conventional banks’ 
pricing behavior. While conventional banks set lower deposit rates when gaining market 
power, we do not observe such a behavior for Islamic banks. Moreover, we also highlight that 
stronger presence of Islamic banks or higher proportion of Muslims in the population shapes 
the relationship between deposit rate and market power at conventional banks. In 
predominantly Islamic environments, where depositors are more reluctant to own conventional 
banks’ financial products which are not Sharia-compliant or when Islamic banks are highly 
present, conventional banks face stronger difficulties to attract depositors, strengthening the 
impact of bank market power on deposit rates.  
 
3.3. Competition in dual banking market 
In this section, we investigate how both types of banks react in terms of deposit rate 
setting depending on the competitiveness either of the whole banking market or of each 
banking segment (Islamic and conventional). We address whether competition occurs in 
possibly segmented markets (where Islamic and conventional banks compete for different 
depositors), in integrated markets (where Islamic and conventional banks compete for the same 
depositors) or, in the case of a one way/asymmetric competition where conventional banks are 
influenced by Islamic banks but not the other way round. We hence alternately replace the 
bank-level measures of market power by our different market-level competition indexes 
(LernerIBjt, LernerCBjt, LernerMKTjt) and re-run the estimations of Equations (1) and (2). The 
results are presented in Tables 5, 6A and 6B. Table 5 reports the impact of competition on 
Islamic and conventional banks’ deposit rates on the Islamic banking segment (columns (1) 
and (4)), on the conventional segment (columns (2) and (5)) and on the overall banking market 
(columns (3) and (6)).  
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Table 4A. Bank market power and Islamic presence 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (3)) and 
conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
See Table B1 for variable definitions. We employ the fixed-effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at 
the bank level for estimations reported in columns (1) and (3). We employ Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator with 
robust jackknife standard errors for estimations reported in columns (2) and (4). 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lerner 0.0356** 0.0223 -0.0324*** -0.0213*** 
 (2.05) (0.40) (-4.44) (-2.63) 
HighShareIB 0.0265***  0.0111***  
 (3.69)  (3.82)  
Lerner x HighShareIB -0.0532***  -0.0146**  
 (-2.99)  (-1.98)  
HighMPOP  0.0204  0.0313*** 
  (1.18)  (7.24) 
Lerner x HighMPOP  -0.0262  -0.0418*** 
  (-0.44)  (-3.94) 
ROE 0.0191 0.0268* 0.00722 0.0106* 
 (1.47) (1.75) (1.57) (1.94) 
Liquidity 0.00552 -0.00357 -0.0179** -0.0112 
 (0.34) (-0.25) (-2.30) (-1.49) 
LLR 0.106** 0.124 -0.0252 -0.0392** 
 (2.03) (0.96) (-1.41) (-2.21) 
Equity 0.0474 0.0514 -0.0128 -0.0281 
 (1.17) (0.76) (-0.44) (-1.03) 
Size 0.0120* 0.00691 0.00868*** 0.00434** 
 (1.87) (1.06) (4.07) (2.53) 
Listed 0.0445*** 0.00493 0.0579*** 0.0000928 
 (2.84) (1.16) (6.73) (0.08) 
Inflation 0.0164 0.0267 0.0115** 0.0151*** 
 (1.09) (1.52) (2.10) (2.70) 
HHI 0.0897 0.0758 -0.0839*** -0.0525*** 
 (1.41) (0.68) (-3.44) (-2.65) 
GGDP -0.00683 -0.00156 -0.0160 -0.0280** 
 (-0.32) (-0.05) (-1.23) (-2.20) 
Constant -0.191* -0.110 -0.0760** -0.0188 
 (-1.84) (-0.90) (-2.21) (-0.69) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 499 499 2257 2280 
N Banks. 96 96 379 380 
R-Squared 0.296  0.327  
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Table 4B. Impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and 
when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) 
 -0.0175 -0.0039 -0.047*** -0.063*** 
 (-1.18) (-0.09) (-5.74) (-7.99) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and 
(3)) and when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different value of 
Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0196*** 0.0169 0.0085*** 0.0238*** 
 (3.38) (1.54) (4.23) (7.30) 
50thpercentile 0.0142*** 0.0143 0.007*** 0.0196*** 
 (2.74) (1.75) (4.00) (6.44) 
75thpercentile 0.0079 0.0111 0.006*** 0.0167*** 
 (1.50) (1.14) (3.43) (5.37) 
 
Considering either the overall market (LernerMKTjt) or each separated segment 
(LernerIBjt, LernerCBjt), stronger competition does not alter Islamic banks' deposit rate setting 
behavior. On the contrary, we find a significant influence of country-level market competition 
on conventional banks' deposit rate setting. Stronger market-level competition leads 
conventional banks to set higher deposit rates. Moreover, while stronger competition within 
the conventional banks' segment impacts conventional banks pricing behavior, market 
conditions on the Islamic banks segment have no impact at all.  
We further find that the importance of Islamic presence significantly alters the behavior 
of conventional banks. Table 6A reports the results when investigating Islamic or conventional 
banks’ reaction either to the competitiveness of their own segment (columns (1) and (2) and 
(7) and (8) respectively) or to the competitiveness of the other segment (columns (3) and (4) 
and (5) and (6) respectively). Table 6B provides the impact of our different market-level Lerner 
indexes when Islamic presence is high (using alternately HighShareIBjt (columns (1), (3), (5) 
and (7)) and HighMPOPj (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) and the impact of Islamic presence 
(using alternatively HighShareIBjt (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) and HighMPOPj (columns 
(2), (4), (6) and (8)) computed at different values of the Lerner index (25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles). 
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Table 5. Market-level competition and banks’ deposit rate 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (1) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to 
(3)) and conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)): 
 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
See Table B1 for variable definitions.  Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  
Islamic banks Conventional banks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LernerIB -0.0270   -0.00516   
 (-1.62)   (-1.03)   
LernerCB  -0.0376   -0.0421***  
  (-1.45)   (-3.29)  
LernerMKT   -0.0342   -0.0454*** 
   (-1.63)   (-3.87) 
ROE 0.0310** 0.0274** 0.0286** -0.00153 0.000947 0.00114 
 (2.30) (2.08) (2.17) (-0.32) (0.19) (0.23) 
Liquidity 0.00389 0.00627 0.00444 -0.0177** -0.0158* -0.0169** 
 (0.30) (0.48) (0.33) (-2.02) (-1.90) (-2.07) 
LLR 0.135** 0.126** 0.130** -0.0182 -0.0287 -0.0271 
 (2.37) (2.03) (2.17) (-1.06) (-1.57) (-1.48) 
Equity 0.0550 0.0627 0.0608 -0.0105 -0.0203 -0.0195 
 (1.26) (1.41) (1.37) (-0.33) (-0.63) (-0.61) 
Size 0.0118* 0.0123* 0.0121* 0.00917*** 0.0105*** 0.0106*** 
 (1.93) (1.89) (1.87) (3.91) (4.31) (4.32) 
Listed 0.00186 0.0223 0.00195 0.0571*** 0.0510*** 0.0507*** 
 (0.59) (1.58) (0.64) (7.41) (5.84) (5.95) 
Inflation 0.0110 0.0148 0.0129 0.0118* 0.0149** 0.0140** 
 (0.64) (0.88) (0.76) (1.75) (2.45) (2.29) 
HHI 0.0929 0.0957 0.0976 -0.0502 -0.0335 -0.0335 
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.30) (-1.58) (-1.16) (-1.15) 
GGDP 0.00133 0.0134 0.00900 -0.0390*** -0.0174 -0.0182 
 (0.06) (0.56) (0.40) (-2.78) (-1.32) (-1.39) 
Constant -0.166 -0.170 -0.168 -0.0924** -0.102** -0.103** 
 (-1.59) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-2.51) (-2.49) (-2.52) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 524 517 524 2278 2338 2338 
N Banks. 97 97 97 384 386 386 
R-Squared 0.236 0.232 0.234 0.270 0.257 0.258 
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Table 6A. Islamic and conventional banking segment competition and Islamic presence 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (4)) and 
conventional banks (columns (5) to (8)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
See Table B1 for variable definitions. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LernerIB -0.0113 -0.00896   0.00132 0.00118   
 (-0.47) (-0.51)   (0.27) (0.21)   
LernerIB x 
HighShareIB -0.0225    -0.025***    
 (-1.18)    (-3.04)    
LernerIB x 
HighMPOP  -0.0590**    -0.039***   
   (-2.33)    (-4.35)   
LernerCB   -0.0142 -0.0759*   -0.044*** -0.0312** 
   (-0.41) (-1.97)   (-3.21) (-2.24) 
LernerCB x 
HighShareIB   -0.0261    0.00943  
   (-0.96)    (0.71)  
LernerCB x 
HighMPOP    0.0120    -0.0358** 
     (0.25)    (-2.30) 
HighShareIB 0.0152*  0.0185*  0.0164***  0.00467  
 (1.97)  (1.96)  (5.84)  (1.02)  
HighMPOP  0.0337***  0.00907  0.0285***  0.0310*** 
  (4.24)  (0.50)  (7.11)  (5.20) 
Constant -0.152 -0.0743 -0.153 -0.0724 -0.0927** -0.0184 -0.0779* -0.0321 
  (-1.46) (-0.65) (-1.37) (-0.57) (-2.49) (-0.56) (-1.90) (-0.89) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 524 524 517 517 2278 2278 2312 2338 
N Banks. 97 97 97 97 384 384 385 386 
R-Squared 0.249  0.246  0.280  0.269  
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Table 6B. The impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) 
and when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) 
 -0.033*** -0.067*** -0.0402* -0.0638* -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.0348** -0.067*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.95) (-1.80) (-1.81) (-2.68) (-4.77) (-2.19) (-4.81) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3)  (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) when Islamic banks market share is above the 
sample mean and when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) computed at 
different value of Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0122** 0.0260*** 0.0137** 0.0112 0.0131*** 0.0233*** 0.0063** 0.0245*** 
 (2.13) (4.06) (2.39) (1.05) (6.38) (6.23) (2.4) (5.95) 
50thpercentile 0.0100** 0.0201*** 0.0111** 0.0124 0.0106*** 0.0193*** 0.0073*** 0.0209*** 
 (2.17) (3.23) (2.34) (1.66) (6.13) (5.11) (3.57) (5.72) 
75thpercentile 0.0073* 0.0130* 0.0933* 0.0132** 0.0076*** 0.0145*** 0.0079*** 0.0184*** 
 (1.81) (1.79) (1.90) (2.04) (4.16) (3.54) (3.84) (4.96) 
 
Our results suggest that both Islamic and conventional banks' behavior are impacted by 
the market conditions of their own segment. Conventional banks set higher deposit rates when 
the degree of competition in their segment is lower, whatever the share of Muslim population 
or the market share of Islamic banks (column (7) and (8)). However, while the strength of 
Islamic presence does not alter the behavior of conventional banks, it matters for Islamic banks. 
We find evidence of a positive effect of competition on Islamic banks' deposit rates only in 
countries with a predominantly Muslim population (column (2)). We also find a negative 
impact of competition in the conventional banks segment on Islamic banks’ deposit rates, but 
only at the 10% level (column (4)). 
Moreover, in countries with either a high share of Muslim population or a strong 
presence of Islamic banks, conventional banks set higher deposit rates when competition in the 
Islamic segment is stronger (columns (5) and (6)). Competitive conditions on the Islamic 
segment influence the pricing behavior of conventional banks but Islamic banks are insensitive 
to the conditions prevailing on the conventional segment (columns (3) and (4)). These results 
are consistent with the possible existence of an asymmetric competition between Islamic and 
conventional banks, which is dependent on the importance of Islamic presence. 
The way that conventional banks set their deposit rate in response to Islamic presence 
is in line with previous papers highlighting the importance of religiosity in dual banking 
markets (Abedifar et al., 2016; Baele et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2012).  
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4. Further investigations and robustness tests 
 
We address the impact of 2007-2009 financial crisis on deposit rate setting behavior of 
Islamic and conventional banks. We construct a dummy variable Crisis which equals one 
during the 2007-2009 period and zero otherwise. In order to address this issue, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 +
𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (3) 
 
Our results (Table 7) show that Islamic banks’ behavior is not impacted by the financial 
crisis whereas conventional banks set a lower deposit rate during the financial crisis and even 
lower when their market power is weaker. 
 We further investigate whether the impact of market competition on deposit rates is 
altered by the degree of competition in the other segment. In order to capture this possible 
effect, we construct two dummy variables, HighLernerIBjt and HighLernerCBjt which take the 
value of one if the value of LernerIBjt and the value of LernerCBjt respectively are above the 
sample mean and zero otherwise. We estimate the following equations: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                           (4) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                            (5) 
 
The results are provided in Table 8. While the degree of competition in the conventional 
banks segment does not influence Islamic banks' behavior, their deposit rates are significantly 
impacted by stronger competition in the Islamic banks segment. Stronger competition in the 
conventional banks segment leads to a higher deposit rate, but only in countries where the 
degree of competition in the Islamic banks segment is high (𝛽3 is positive and significant). In 
other words, stronger competition in the Islamic banks segment leads conventional banks to 
set higher deposit rates.  
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Table 7. Impact of the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (3) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (column (1)) 
and conventional banks (column (2)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
See Table B1 for variable definitions. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Islamic banks Conventional banks 
(1) (2) 
Lerner 0.0129 -0.0355*** 
 (0.66) (-4.99) 
Crisis -0.0140 -0.0164*** 
 (-1.03) (-2.75) 
Lerner x Crisis -0.00849 -0.0184* 
 (-0.84) (-1.96) 
ROE 0.0225* 0.00785 
 (1.70) (1.53) 
Liquidity 0.0000991 -0.0140* 
 (0.01) (-1.85) 
LLR 0.121* -0.0291 
 (1.83) (-1.61) 
Equity 0.0623 -0.0150 
 (1.34) (-0.50) 
Size 0.0132** 0.00931*** 
 (2.06) (4.36) 
Listed 0.0437*** 0.0521*** 
 (2.75) (6.87) 
Inflation 0.0322* 0.0213*** 
 (1.86) (3.76) 
HHI 0.0907 -0.0434* 
 (1.23) (-1.89) 
GGDP -0.0105 -0.0254** 
 (-0.45) (-2.09) 
Constant -0.197* -0.0883** 
 (-1.83) (-2.53) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
N Obs. 499 2280 
N Banks 96 380 
R-squared 0.249 0.316 
Impact of Lerner during the crisis period (β1+ β3) 0.0044 -0.0539*** 
 (0.20) (-4.19) 
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Table 8. Reaction of Islamic and conventional banks to competitive conditions in the other 
market segment 
 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equations (4) and (5) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (column (1)) 
and conventional banks (column (2)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
See Table B1 for variable definitions. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) 
LernerIB -0.0205  
 (-0.99)  
HighLernerCB -0.00441  
 (-1.00)  
LernerIB x HighLernerCB -0.00734  
 (-0.38)  
LernerCB  -0.0447*** 
  (-3.05) 
HighLernerIB  -0.0106*** 
  (-3.06) 
LernerCB x HighLernerIB  0.0313*** 
  (3.04) 
Constant -0.155 -0.0881** 
 (-1.49) (-2.16) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes 
N Obs. 517 2278 
N Banks 97 384 
R-squared 0.240 0.280 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β2) when the competition in the conventional banking segment is low (column (1)) and 
when the competition in the Islamic banking segment is low (column (2)) 
 -0.0278 -0.01337 
  (-1.42) (-0.78) 
 
As highlighted by the existing literature, market interest rates significantly impact 
Islamic banks' behavior. In contradiction with the interest-free principle, Ergeç and Arslan 
(2013) find evidence of a significant influence of market interest rates on deposit rates of 
Islamic banks in Turkey. Caporale et al. (2016) also highlight a significant impact of interest 
rate shocks on Islamic bank lending even though this effect is weaker than for conventional 
banks. We hence include in our regressions a short-term market interest rate (Interest rate). 
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Due to the high correlation between Inflation and Interest rate, we drop the variable Inflation 
when including Interest rate. Short term interest rate data are taken from the International 
Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund9. As highlighted in the existing 
literature, we find a positive and significant impact of market interest rates on deposit rates for 
both IBs and CBs. We still find conventional banks to set higher deposit rates when their market 
power is lower and even lower in predominantly Islamic environment ((β1+β3) is negative and 
significant) (Tables 9A and 9B). 
We also conduct some robustness tests. We replace the return on equity (ROE) by the 
return on assets (ROA). Our main results remain identical (Tables 10A and 10B).  
Following Rosen (2007) who argues that the presence of ROE in such models may lead 
to endogeneity issues, we also conduct our regressions by using the instrumental variables (IV) 
technique. One-year lagged ROE is instrumented by two-year lagged ROE, ROE Industry, and 
market development (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP per capita). The 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistics indicates that the instruments we use are strong. The non-
significant value of the Hansen J-Statistics (over-identification test) indicates that our 
instruments are not correlated with the error term. Using IV leaves our main results unchanged 
(Table 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 Out of the 20 countries of our sample, there are two countries (Sudan and United Arab Emirates) for which short 
term interest rate data are not available over our sample period.  
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Table 9A. The impact of market interest rate 
  
This table displays the estimation results of Equations (1) and (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to 
(3)) and conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)), when we replace inflation by market (short-term) interest rates. See 
Table B1 for variable definitions. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lerner 0.0207 0.0298 0.0454 -0.0325*** -0.0303*** -0.0219*** 
 (1.11) (1.64) (0.79) (-4.65) (-4.21) (-2.61) 
HighShareIB  0.0126***   0.00205  
  (2.84)   (0.78)  
Lerner x HighShareIB  -0.0284*   -0.0149**  
  (-1.98)   (-2.00)  
HighMPOP   0.00691   0.00726 
   (0.42)   (1.63) 
Lerner x HighMPOP   -0.0460   -0.0264** 
   (-0.81)   (-2.51) 
Interest 0.00304*** 0.00280*** 0.00308*** 0.00404*** 0.00408*** 0.00381*** 
 (5.44) (5.17) (4.54) (11.35) (11.27) (12.87) 
Constant -0.102 -0.104 -0.0389 0.0287 0.0298 0.0470*** 
 (-1.16) (-1.18) (-0.53) (1.23) (1.27) (2.97) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 438 438 438 2098 2072 2098 
N Banks 81 81 81 363 361 363 
R-squared 0.260 0.279  0.356 0.359  
 
Table 9B. The impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and 
when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) 
 0.0014 -0.0005 0.04522*** -0.0482*** 
 (0.09) (-0.01) (-5.55) (-6.41) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3) (columns (1) and (3)) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample 
mean and when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different value of 
Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0086 0.00047 -0.0007 0.0022 
 (2.22) (0.04) (-0.49) (0.67) 
50thpercentile 0.00576 -0.0041 -0.0021 -0.0001 
 (1.41) (-0.46) (-1.53) (-0.04) 
75thpercentile 0.0029 -0.0087 -0.0033** -0.0022 
 (0.62) (-0.82) (-2.29) (-0.68) 
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Table 10A. Robustness: Alternative measure of PLS 
  
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (1) and (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (column (1), (2), 
and (3)) and conventional banks (column (4), (5), and (6)) when replacing ROE by ROA. See Table B1 for variable 
definitions. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.   
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lerner 0.00554 0.0172 0.0128 -0.0381*** -0.0359*** -0.0210*** 
 (0.30) (0.94) (0.26) (-5.23) (-4.94) (-2.59) 
HighShareIB  0.0166***   0.00609***  
  (3.08)   (2.64)  
Lerner x HighShareIB  -0.0305**   -0.00288  
  (-2.22)   (-0.44)  
HighMPOP   0.0183   0.0316*** 
   (1.14)   (7.16) 
Lerner x HighMPOP   -0.0206   -0.0422*** 
   (-0.36)   (-3.86) 
ROA 0.300*** 0.262** 0.303** 0.0379 0.0262 0.0749* 
 (2.87) (2.55) (2.42) (0.85) (0.60) (1.72) 
Constant -0.184* -0.181* -0.101 -0.0949*** -0.0773** -0.0208 
 (-1.68) (-1.71) (-0.81) (-2.70) (-2.27) (-0.76) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 499 499 499 2280 2257 2280 
N Banks 96 96 96 380 379 380 
R-squared 0.267 0.295  0.310 0.324  
 
Table 10B. The impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 
  Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and 
when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) 
 -0.0132 -0.0078 -0.0387*** -0.063*** 
  (-0.98) (-0.17) (-4.37) (-7.4) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3)  (columns (1) and (3)) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample 
mean and when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different value of 
Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0123*** 0.0154 0.0055*** 0.0235*** 
 (2.67) (1.56) (3.18) (7.22) 
50thpercentile 0.0092** 0.01335 0.0052*** 0.0197*** 
 (2.06) (1.69) (3.05) (6.42) 
75thpercentile 0.0062 0.0112 0.0050*** 0.0163*** 
  (1.29) (1.18) (2.68) (5.17) 
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Table 11. Robustness: instrumental variable regression 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equations (1) and (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns 
(1) and (2)) and conventional banks (columns (3) and (4)). See Table B1 for variable definitions. We conduct 
our regressions using the instrumental variables technique. We report the Hansen J-Statistics for the validity 
of our instruments and the Kleinbergen-Paap wald F-Statistics for the strength of our instruments. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Islamic banks Conventional banks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lerner 0.0106 0.0235 -0.0487*** -0.0441*** 
 (0.66) (1.30) (-6.43) (-5.30) 
HighShareIB  0.0168***  0.00728** 
  (3.84)  (2.47) 
Lerner x HighShareIB  -0.0440***  -0.00812 
  (-3.13)  (-1.07) 
ROE 0.0118 0.0315 0.0547*** 0.0516*** 
 (0.39) (1.10) (4.30) (4.09) 
Liquidity 0.00738 0.00749 -0.0170** -0.0201*** 
 (0.56) (0.54) (-2.56) (-3.02) 
LLR 0.0804** 0.0876** -0.00704 -0.00387 
 (2.17) (2.52) (-0.36) (-0.20) 
Equity 0.0841** 0.0816** -0.0413 -0.0440* 
 (2.28) (2.42) (-1.63) (-1.74) 
Size 0.0162*** 0.0124** 0.00806*** 0.00779*** 
 (2.98) (2.33) (4.59) (4.39) 
Listed 0.0258* 0.0207 0.0248*** 0.0308*** 
 (1.70) (1.34) (5.55) (6.00) 
Inflation 0.0441*** 0.0280** 0.0206*** 0.0147** 
 (2.91) (2.11) (2.93) (2.16) 
HHI 0.254*** 0.260*** -0.0316 -0.0770*** 
 (3.64) (3.83) (-1.60) (-4.01) 
GGDP -0.0359 -0.0322 -0.0238** -0.0199* 
 (-1.26) (-1.14) (-2.05) (-1.78) 
N Obs 413 413 2063 2041 
N Banks 71 71 319 318 
R-squared 0.361 0.396 0.247 0.266 
Hansen J stat. (chi-sq.) 0.683 0.09 3.173 4.577 
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.7106 0.9561 0.2046 0.1014 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat. 8.375*** 12.743*** 27.722*** 27.946*** 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic bank market share is above the sample mean 
  -0.0205  -0.0522*** 
   (-1.79)  (-6.38) 
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5. Conclusion 
  
This chapter investigates the impact of competition in dual banking markets and focuses 
on differences in deposit rate setting in Islamic and conventional banks. While, in theory, the 
specific nature of deposit accounts at Islamic banks should lead to significant differences 
compared with conventional banks' deposits, the literature has so far argued that Islamic and 
conventional banks deposit rates are closely pegged. We show that there are nevertheless 
notable differences in the determinants of deposit rates in the two types of institutions. Market 
power measured at the individual bank level by the Lerner index is only significant for 
conventional banks. Moreover, in predominantly Muslim countries or in countries with an 
important presence of Islamic banks, conventional banks set higher deposit rates and such rates 
are even higher for conventional banks with relatively lower market power. In such 
environments, conventional banks presumably face stronger difficulties to attract depositors, 
strengthening thereby the impact of competition. We further find that the conventional banks 
are sensitive to deposit rates offered by Islamic banks, while Islamic banks are only influenced 
by their peers and mostly in predominantly Muslim countries.   
 Our findings have important policy implications for the future of banking in dual 
markets where conventional and Islamic banks operate alongside and specifically in countries 
where Islamic banks are persistently gaining market shares. By providing some insights into 
the nature of competition in such dual markets, our work stresses the need to further investigate 
the degree of substitutability between the products and services provided by Islamic and 
conventional banks. The extent to which Islamic and conventional banks evolve in either 
segmented or integrated markets is of great importance for regulators in order to accurately 
measure market concentration in such dual banking markets. Moreover, because conventional 
banks are found to significantly react to stronger competition from Islamic banks, bank 
regulators and supervisors should carefully monitor price-setting behavior in both types of 
institutions in such dual markets to prevent possible destructive competition which could in 
turn jeopardize overall financial stability. 
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Appendix A: Lerner index computation 
 
The Lerner index we compute here is consistent with Berger et al. (2009), Love and 
Martinez-Peria (2015), Turk-Ariss (2010) and Weill (2011). Total cost is estimated using the 
following trans-logarithm cost function:  
ln(TC) = ∝0+∝1 ln(TA) +
1
2
∝2 (ln TA)
2 + ∑ βj
3
j=1
ln(Wj) + ∑ ∑ βjk
3
k=1
3
j=1
ln(Wj) ln(Wk)
+ ∑ γj
3
j=1
ln(TA) ln(Wj) + ε.   (i) 
TC denotes total costs (sum of total interest expenses and total non-interest expenses) 
and TA is total assets. We use three input prices: (1) price of labor, W1; price of capital, W2; 
and price of funds, W3. The price of labor is calculated by dividing personnel expenses to total 
assets. The price of capital is computed by calculating the ratio of other operating expenses to 
total assets. The price of funding is the ratio of interest expenses to total customer deposits. 
After we obtain all the coefficients from the cost function, we compute marginal cost by using 
equation (ii) as follows. 
MC =
TC
TA
(∝1+∝2 ln(TA) + ∑ γj ln (Wj)
3
j=1
).   (ii) 
Lernerit =
Priceit − MCit
Priceit
.   (iii) 
Finally, the bank level Lerner index can be calculated using equation (iii). The Lerner 
index summarizes the differences between price of product and marginal costs, scaled by price. 
Price is the ratio of total revenue (sum of total interest income and total non-interest operating 
income) to total assets. Generally speaking, a higher value of the Lerner index indicates higher 
market power or lower market competition because banks are able to set the price above the 
marginal cost in less competitive markets. The value of the Lerner index ranges between 0 
(high market power/lowly competitive market) and 1 (low market power/highly competitive 
market). However, the Lerner index can also be negative for inefficient banks (Soedarmono et 
al., 2011). 
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Appendix B: Correlation matrix 
 
Table B2. Correlation matrix of Islamic banks’ sub-sample 
 
 
Deposit 
rate Lerner 
Lerner 
IB 
Lerner 
CB 
Lerner 
MKT 
High 
ShareIB 
High 
MPOP ROE Liquidity LLR Equity Size ROA Listed Inflation HHI GGDP Interest 
Deposit rate 1.000                  
Lerner -0.151 1.000                 
LernerIB -0.117 0.637 1.000                
LernerCB -0.428 0.447 0.586 1.000               
LernerMKT -0.407 0.462 0.635 0.984 1.000              
HighShareIB -0.080 0.116 0.353 0.364 0.342 1.000             
HighMPOP 0.263 0.196 0.475 0.209 0.247 0.214 1.000            
ROE 0.031 0.564 0.444 0.160 0.193 0.072 0.233 1.000           
Liquidity -0.152 -0.275 -0.321 0.016 0.003 -0.182 -0.273 -0.327 1.000          
LLR 0.100 -0.216 -0.256 -0.177 -0.190 -0.044 0.058 -0.298 0.197 1.000         
Equity 0.137 -0.067 0.052 0.221 0.229 0.080 0.133 -0.106 0.236 0.063 1.000        
Size -0.351 0.520 0.424 0.451 0.446 0.268 0.108 0.327 -0.288 -0.172 -0.252 1.000       
ROA 0.115 0.606 0.516 0.220 0.254 0.096 0.235 0.642 -0.232 -0.334 0.127 0.342 1.000      
Listed 0.103 0.040 0.024 -0.026 -0.005 -0.251 0.008 0.065 0.261 -0.026 0.157 -0.171 0.107 1.000     
Inflation 0.247 -0.054 0.069 -0.101 -0.096 0.030 0.326 0.058 0.040 0.067 0.074 -0.156 0.074 0.275 1.000    
HHI 0.007 0.232 0.229 0.247 0.261 -0.093 0.199 0.002 0.130 0.117 0.320 -0.103 0.198 0.115 0.059 1.000   
GGDP 0.087 0.027 -0.045 -0.083 -0.089 -0.138 -0.045 0.131 -0.074 -0.026 -0.103 -0.036 0.038 -0.069 0.184 -0.179 1.000  
Interest 0.441 -0.177 -0.088 -0.483 -0.470 -0.002 0.406 0.002 -0.150 0.110 -0.117 -0.413 -0.069 0.019 0.406 -0.115 -0.034 1.000 
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Table B3. Correlation matrix of conventional banks’ sub-sample. 
 
 
Deposit 
rate Lerner 
Lerner 
IB 
Lerner 
CB 
Lerner 
MKT 
High 
ShareIB 
High 
MPOP ROE Liquidity LLR Equity Size ROA Listed Inflation HHI GGDP Interest 
 
Deposit rate 1.000                   
Lerner -0.377 1.000                  
LernerIB 0.060 0.269 1.000                 
Lerner CB -0.285 0.479 0.399 1.000                
LernerMKT -0.273 0.464 0.415 0.986 1.000               
HighShareIB 0.017 0.160 0.326 0.257 0.222 1.000              
HighMPOP 0.244 0.070 0.591 0.175 0.186 0.195 1.000             
ROE 0.013 0.444 0.203 0.134 0.138 -0.041 0.087 1.000            
Liquidity -0.145 -0.023 -0.197 -0.097 -0.125 -0.096 -0.172 -0.064 1.000           
LLR 0.035 -0.092 0.156 -0.049 -0.059 0.148 0.190 -0.265 0.153 1.000          
Equity 0.008 0.125 0.204 0.139 0.146 0.050 0.111 -0.024 0.121 0.117 1.000         
Size -0.255 0.208 -0.142 -0.014 -0.025 0.043 -0.128 0.096 -0.183 -0.214 -0.455 1.000        
ROA -0.029 0.573 0.255 0.191 0.200 -0.009 0.111 0.760 -0.059 -0.240 0.197 -0.004 1.000       
Listed 0.055 -0.021 -0.130 -0.013 -0.005 -0.178 -0.035 0.041 0.132 0.081 -0.033 -0.029 -0.003 1.000      
Inflation 0.238 -0.043 0.256 -0.007 -0.002 0.047 0.337 0.066 -0.092 0.122 0.082 -0.180 0.097 0.230 1.000     
HHI -0.167 0.093 0.061 0.048 0.046 -0.108 0.002 0.012 0.221 0.172 -0.002 0.002 0.017 0.189 -0.030 1.000    
GGDP 0.075 0.034 0.228 0.066 0.068 -0.080 0.232 0.132 -0.061 -0.060 0.112 -0.148 0.145 -0.042 0.174 -0.151 1.000   
Interest 0.580 -0.182 0.301 -0.268 -0.265 0.098 0.435 0.112 -0.129 0.196 0.055 -0.308 0.126 -0.028 0.446 -0.165 0.083 1.000  
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Chapter 2 
Competition-stability nexus in the dual banking market 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the impact of market competition on the stability of Islamic and 
conventional banks in countries where these banks operate alongside one another. To 
investigate this issue, we use a sample of 100 Islamic and 390 conventional banks from 19 
countries. Our baseline result shows that competition in a dual market erodes banks’ stability. 
The heightened competitive pressure in a dual market encourages banks to engage in excessive 
risk-taking that can jeopardize their stability. However, the effect of competition is missing for 
Islamic banks, suggesting their superiority in having religious clients. Although our overall 
results support the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis, we find that competition can be 
beneficial for banks, especially at a low to medium competition level. Last, we also find that 
the adverse impact of competition can be reduced by having high capitalization, especially in 
the case of a conventional bank. Some policy implications are discussed in this study. 
 
Keywords: Competition, stability, dual banking, Islamic banks, Z-score, Lerner index 
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1. Introduction 
There is an intense debate in the banking literature on the relationship between 
competition and stability. A seminal paper by Keeley (1990) initiated the debate by showing 
that a high level of competition erodes the charter or franchise value (present value of future 
profitability), which therefore reduces banks’ incentives to behave prudently. Under this 
‘competition-fragility’ view, banks cannot earn monopoly rents in a competitive market and 
hence suffer from weaker profits and lower stability. This hypothesis is supported by some 
works (Hellmann et al., 2000; Jiménez et al., 2013; Repullo, 2004). Boyd and Nicoló (2005) 
challenge this argument by promoting the ‘competition-stability’ hypothesis. Increased 
competition in the banking market will force banks to give a lower loan rate to the borrower. 
Accordingly, banks’ probability of default is reduced because borrowers have a higher 
probability of loan repayment. Boyd et al. (2006) and Schaeck et al. (2009), among others, 
support this view. 
In the present study, we address the relationship between competition and stability in 
the dual banking market where Islamic and conventional banks operate alongside one another. 
This is a major issue in banking studies because, according to the data from the World Bank1, 
the dual banking system is now adopted in more than 50 countries. The remarkable growth of 
Islamic banks in the dual market is likely to have an impact on banks’ stability. Are Islamic 
banks more stable than conventional banks? Does the banking system respond positively to the 
intensified competition between the two bank types? This study aims to answer these questions. 
Additionally, the issue of competition and stability in a dual banking market is interesting 
because in this banking system, two types of banks compete to attract customers. Despite the 
fact that Islamic banks are relatively new to the market, conventional banks’ behavior in the 
dual market has changed in reaction to this situation. A recent study by Meslier et al. (2017) 
shows that conventional banks counter Islamic banks’ competitive pressure by setting higher 
deposit rates when their market power is lower. The behavior of conventional banks, in this 
case, could jeopardize their financial stability.  
Despite the importance of the competition-stability issue in the dual banking system, 
previous studies in this area are surprisingly muted, many of which investigated competition 
and stability separately. On the one hand, some prior works highlight competitive conditions 
in a dual banking system. Using multiple countries data, Turk-Ariss (2010) and Hamza and 
                                                     
1 http://go.worldbank.org/AE0U8AYQ20  
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Katchouli (2014) highlight that the Islamic banking market is less competitive compared to 
conventional banking, whereas Weill (2011) does not find significant differences between 
them. In a similar vein, Cupian and Abduh (2017), using a single country dataset, find that 
Islamic banks in Indonesia have high market power as an implication of the low degree of 
competition. On the other hand, a strand of literature has investigated Islamic banks’ stability 
compared to its conventional counterparts. Cihak and Hesse (2010) begin the discussion by 
providing empirical evidence about Islamic banks’ stability relative to their size. They find that 
small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than small conventional banks and large 
Islamic banks. Abedifar et al. (2013) confirm the finding by showing that small Islamic banks 
have lower credit risk and are more stable than conventional banks. Beck et al. (2013) highlight 
that even though Islamic and conventional banks are not different regarding their business 
model, Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality, and are less likely to 
disintermediate during a crisis. The last finding was also supported recently by Fakhfekh et al. 
(2016), who observe that Islamic banks are more resilient than conventional banks, although 
the degree of resilience is heterogeneous and sample dependent.  
A recent study by Kabir and Worthington (2017), to the best of our knowledge, is the 
only study that specifically investigates the impact of market competition on banks’ stability 
in the context of the dual banking system. Their results support the ‘competition fragility’ 
hypothesis. They also find that the magnitude of the market power effect on stability is greater 
for conventional banks than Islamic banks. Although investigating the same issue, this work 
will be different in some respects and therefore contribute to the literature in several ways. 
First, we use different techniques and different variable measurements. Whereas Kabir and 
Worthington (2017) use panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) and two-stage quantile 
regression, this study will use fixed-effect (FE) and two-stages least squares (2SLS). 
Furthermore, in contrast to Kabir and Worthington (2017), who focus on both accounting (Z-
score) and market-based measures of stability (distance-to-default), our approach only focuses 
on accounting measures because (1) it is directly related to the probability of banks’ 
insolvency 2 , (3) it is popular and widely used in the empirical banking study and is 
implemented as a time-varying measure in panel studies, and (3) it uses market-based measure 
stock price data to estimate volatility in the stock price data, but most Islamic banks are not 
listed in the equity market3. In addition, following Leon (2015), rather than using a bank-level 
                                                     
2 For instance, the probability that the value of its assets becomes lower than the value of the debt. 
3 Since we only use accounting measures, we can cover more countries than Kabir and Worthington (2017). 
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Lerner index as in Kabir and Worthington (2017) to measure competition, we use a weighted 
average Lerner index at the country level. We believe that this measure will be more 
appropriate in our case since we investigate the impact of country-level market competition, 
not bank-level market power. We also use H-Statistics as another proxy of competition at the 
country level in the robustness section. 
Second, in the present chapter, we go further by considering the moderating role of 
capitalization, crisis, and bank size. We investigate whether these conditions may alter the 
relationship between competition and stability. Our approach is motivated by some prior works 
highlighting the importance of capitalization, crisis, and bank size on banks’ stability. 
Schliephake (2016) show that bank capitalization moderates the impact of competition on 
financial stability. Cihak and Hesse (2010) document that smaller Islamic banks have better 
stability than larger banks, even though Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017) have recently found that 
larger Islamic banks are stronger. Regarding financial crises, other works show that Islamic 
banks are more resilient than conventional banks during financial panics (Beck et al., 2013; 
Farooq and Zaheer, 2015; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Olson and Zoubi, 2016). 
To investigate the above-mentioned issues, we employ a dataset containing 100 Islamic 
and 390 conventional banks from 19 countries where the dual banking market applies. Our 
baseline result shows that competition between Islamic and conventional banks in the dual 
market erodes financial stability. This finding remains consistent after controlling for both 
bank- and country-specific variables. The finding is also robust either when we use the FE 
technique or consider the endogeneity problem by using the 2SLS technique. Our result 
confirms the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis in a dual market proposed by Kabir and 
Worthington (2017). The heightened competition between Islamic and conventional banks may 
encourage banks to take excessive risks that could threaten their financial stability. In the next 
analysis, we find that even though competition promotes financial fragility in the dual market, 
the impact for Islamic and conventional banks is different. Intensified dual market competition 
is not significant for Islamic banks where conventional banks are significantly impacted. This 
result is different from Kabir and Worthington (2017), who find a similar effect for two bank 
types but is in line with Meslier et al. (2017), who find the missing effect of competition on 
Islamic banks’ deposit rate setting. Islamic banks might benefit from captive clients, making 
them more stable even in a highly competitive market. Moreover, we also observe in this study 
that the different level of competition will yield a different impact on conventional banks’ 
stability. Whereas Islamic banks are not affected either by low or high competitive pressure, 
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conventional banks’ stability increases when the competition is low, and conversely, it 
significantly shrinks when competition is high. 
Regarding the further analysis, in the present work, we also find that the competition-
stability nexus in the dual market is also altered by bank capitalization and size. Competition 
promotes financial fragility, but their effect diminishes when banks have high capital ratio 
(lower solvency risk). This result is consistent with Schliephake (2016). The detrimental effect 
of competition increases with an increase of the bank’s size. It suggests that the competition-
fragility nexus is more pronounced in large banks. Banks in the dual market appear to be more 
stable when operating on a small scale rather than a large scale. Our finding, therefore, supports 
Cihak and Hesse (2010). Additionally, we also find little evidence that Islamic banks’ stability 
increases with the impact of competition during the crisis period, which is in line with the prior 
literature highlighting the superiority of Islamic banks during the financial crisis (Farooq and 
Zaheer, 2015; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Olson and Zoubi, 2016). 
Taking all of the results altogether, two policy implications can be offered from this 
chapter. First, regulators and supervisors should carefully monitor competitive conditions in 
the dual banking market. The heightened dual market competition could encourage banks, 
either Islamic or conventional banks, to take excessive risk that thus jeopardizes their financial 
stability. Regulators should also monitor banks’ capitalization and size since it can moderate 
the adverse impact of competition. Second, even though we find that the impact of market 
competition differs for Islamic and conventional banks, it is not necessary to separate 
competition regulation for two bank types. Instead, countries with dual markets can establish 
an institution that specifically focuses on Islamic banking development to promote Islamic 
banks’ position as a complement for conventional banks. This is important because one of the 
aims of Islamic banks in the dual market is to reach religious unbanked people who do not 
interact with interest-based financial institutions. When Islamic banks can play a role as a 
complement, it benefits in terms of more financial inclusion. An example of this institution is 
the Shariah Directorate in the central bank of Indonesia that is specifically supervising and 
promoting Islamic banking development (Choudhury and Harahap, 2009; Choudhury and 
Nurul Alam, 2013). 
The structure of our chapter is as follows. Section 2 explains the data, variables, and 
methodology we use. Section 3 presents the result we obtain in this study, including further 
analysis and robustness tests. Section 4 concludes the chapter. 
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2. Data, variables, and methodology 
2.1. Data 
We extract all of our bank-level dataset from BvD Bankscope. We focus on countries 
with both Islamic and conventional banks. Following prior work in Islamic banking (Abedifar 
et al., 2013; Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Meslier et al., 2017), we correct the misclassification 
issues in Bankscope by cross-checking our Bankscope data, the World Bank dataset in Islamic 
banks, and each Islamic bank’s website. After obtaining the correct Islamic and conventional 
banks’ sample, we create the ratios, winsorize the extreme values at the 1st and 99th percentiles, 
and retain for banks with a minimum of 4 observations. Our final sample covers 100 Islamic 
and conventional banks with a total 3458 observations. Regarding country-level data, we obtain 
the inflation rate and the growth of GDP from the World Bank website. We also use the 
measure of law enforcement (rule of law) and government efficiency obtained from the world 
governance indicators (WGI) dataset. Table 1 provides details of the number of banks in each 
country and some country-level variables. 
 
2.2. Dependent variable: Z-score 
We use the Z-score, which has been extensively applied in the banking literature to 
measure bank stability. The Z-score measures the standard deviation that the banks’ return has 
to diminish to deplete equity. The Z-score is computed as follows. 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴
    …   (1) 
where ROA is return on assets for bank i and year t, EQTA is the capital asset ratio for 
bank i and year t, and SDROA is the standard deviation of ROA calculated over the full sample. 
According to Lepetit and Strobel (2013), the Z-score computation method, as seen in equation 
(1), are practical because it provides a time-varying z-score without requiring initial 
observations to be dropped as in the rolling approach. The standard deviation of ROA 
(SDROAit) that was computed over the full sample as in equation (1), after being tested by 
Lepetit and Strobel (2013), also provides a lower average RMSE (Root Mean Squared Error) 
than the rolling moment method. Moreover, our approach in equation (1) has also been used 
by many works previously (Beck et al., 2013; Cihák and Hesse, 2007; Fiordelisi and Mare, 
2014; Fu et al., 2014; Laeven and Levine, 2009)4. Because the distribution of the Z-score is 
                                                     
4 Lepetit and Strobel (2013) also propose a new method of Z-score computation. We will use it in the robustness 
section. 
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highly skewed, we use a natural logarithm of the Z-score (Anginer et al., 2014; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). A higher value of the Z-score means a lower probability of insolvency risk and 
therefore better bank stability.  
 
Table 1. The number of banks in sample countries and some country-level variables. 
 
Country 
Islamic 
banks 
Conv. 
banks LernerMkt HSTAT HHI Law GovEff 
Bahrain 12 9 0.192 n.a. 0.158 0.487 0.504 
Bangladesh 5 27 0.208 0.634 0.085 -0.827 -0.760 
Egypt 2 21 0.135 n.a. 0.146 -0.325 -0.581 
Indonesia 3 64 0.281 0.425 0.097 -0.672 -0.277 
Iraq 1 3 0.292 n.a. 0.157 -1.555 -1.163 
Jordan 3 9 0.282 0.390 0.373 0.364 0.130 
Kenya 1 29 0.320 0.386 0.109 -0.887 -0.544 
Kuwait 9 5 0.444 n.a. 0.186 0.561 0.082 
Malaysia 16 25 0.291 0.386 0.091 0.502 1.085 
Pakistan 7 22 0.256 n.a. 0.106 -0.853 -0.640 
Qatar 3 6 0.486 n.a. 0.270 0.798 0.716 
Saudi Arabia 6 7 0.467 0.194 0.115 0.175 -0.134 
South Africa 1 15 0.204 0.564 0.288 0.100 0.507 
Sudan 14 2 0.214 n.a. 0.301 -1.340 -1.315 
Tunisia 1 8 0.318 n.a. 0.116 0.051 0.292 
Turkey 4 25 0.146 0.434 0.122 0.076 0.290 
United Arab Emirates 8 17 0.448 0.501 0.102 0.530 0.948 
United Kingdom 2 93 0.219 0.442 0.128 1.682 1.672 
Yemen 2 3 0.274 n.a. 0.284 -1.144 -1.051 
Total 100 390           
Mean     0.274 0.438 0.139 0.181 0.343 
 
2.3. Independent variable: Lerner index 
The degree of competition in the banking market can be proxied through a traditional 
industrial organization or newer empirical approaches. The former approach investigates the 
extent of market competition indirectly through the structural-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis, which explains that the level of market power of the bank can be examined through 
the bank performance. Researchers usually use the concentration ratio, market share, or 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The latter approach originated from the inadequacy of 
traditional measurements because the measures of bank performance that measure SCP theory 
do not appropriately indicate the degree of bank market power (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
Therefore, the level of bank competition should be measured endogenously (Soedarmono et 
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al., 2011). The popular measurements in a newer empirical approach are the Panzar-Rosse 
model and the Lerner index. In the present study, we employ the Lerner index to measure 
market competition5. We do not use traditional measurements of competition (concentration 
ratios) because prior studies report that bank concentration is an insufficient and ambiguous 
measure (Berger et al., 2009, 2004)6. 
The Lerner index corresponds to banks’ strength in influencing the price of their 
banking products. Typically, the Lerner index is a markup of the banks’ price of the product 
over their marginal costs. A higher value Lerner index indicates greater market power. We 
follow the previous work of Meslier et al. (2017), Turk-Ariss (2010) and Weill (2011) to create 
the index. The index is computed by the following equation. 
Lernerit =
Priceit − MarginalCostit
Priceit
    …   (2) 
Price is the ratio of total banks’ revenue to total assets. Marginal cost is the first 
difference of the trans-log cost function as follows. 
MarginalCost =
TotalCosts
TotalAssets
(∝1+∝2 lnTotalAssets + ∑ γj ln (Wj)
3
j=1
)    …   (3) 
lnTotalCosts = ∝0+∝1 lnTotalAssets +
1
2
∝2 lnTotalAssets
2 + ∑ βj
3
j=1
ln(Wj)
+ ∑ ∑ βjk
3
k=1
3
j=1
ln(Wj) ∗ ln(Wk) + ∑ γj
3
j=1
lnTotalAssets ∗ ln(Wj) + ε    …   (4) 
where Wj corresponds to (1) W1: the price of labor: the ratio of personnel expenses to total 
assets; (2) W2: the price of capital: the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets; and 
(3) W3: the price of the fund: the ratio of interest expense to total banks’ funding. The cost 
function in equation (5) is estimated at the country level using a fixed-effect estimator. 
Since we focus on the market-level competition, following Leon (2015) and Meslier et 
al. (2017), we use the weighted average value of the Lerner index to create a country-level 
Lerner index (LernerMktjt). Therefore, the Lerner index can be interpreted directly as a degree 
of banking market competition instead of bank-level market power. A greater LernerMkt 
implies lower competition because when competition is high, most of the banks (on average) 
are not supposed to have strong market power. 
                                                     
5 The Panzar-Rosse model will be also used in this paper in the robustness check. 
6 Instead, we will use HHI in the controls to consider the market concentration. 
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2.4. Controls 
We also include a set of bank-level and country-level controls in our analysis. First, we 
use net interest margins (NIMit). To calculate NIM, we follow Trinugroho et al. (2014) by 
employing a ratio of net interest income to total earning assets. According to Fu et al. (2014), 
it is necessary to employ NIM because we need to control banks’ profitability, especially 
regarding a bank’s investing and lending activities. Second, we use LLRit (ratio of loan loss 
reserve to total assets) to control banks’ credit risk. Soedarmono et al. (2011) note that one of 
the most important determinants of bank stability is a credit risk. Third, we employ EQTAit 
(capitalization). Abedifar et al. (2013) mention that banks with high capital ratio can have a 
higher capacity of risk taking, which therefore may influence their financial stability. 
Schliephake (2016) also find the different effect of competition between high and low 
capitalized banking sectors. We also control bank size using a log of total assets (LnTAit) as 
seen in Čihák and Hesse (2010), who observe the different performances of small and large 
Islamic and conventional banks in dual markets. To control the macroeconomic differences, 
we use inflation (INFLjt), GDP Growth (GGDPjt), and the 2008-2009 financial crisis period 
(Crisisjt). The summary of our variable explanations is provided in Table 2. We also provide 
the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
2.5. Methodology 
To investigate the impact of market competition on banks’ stability, we construct the 
following equation: 
LnZROAit = α0 + βLernerMktjt + φXit−1 + γZjt + εi,t     …   (5) 
where subscripts i, j, and t correspond to bank i, country j, and year t. LnZROAjt is bank 
stability, LernerMktjt is the average value of the Lerner index as our measure of market 
competition, Xit-1 is a vector of bank-level variables (NIM, LLR, EQTA, Size) in a one-year 
lagged period, and Zjt is a vector of country-level variables (INFL, GGDP, Crisis). Equation 
(5) will be estimated using fixed-effect estimators with the robust standard error clustered at 
the bank levels. 
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Table 2. Variables description. 
 
Variable Definition Primary references Source 
LnZit Log of Z-score to measure bank 
stability. 
(Beck et al., 2013; Fu et al., 
2014) 
Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
LnAltZit An alternative measurement of 
the Z-score 
(Lepetit and Strobel, 2013) Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
LernerMktjt The country weighted-average 
value of banks’ Lerner index to 
measure market competition. 
The Lerner index is calculated 
using a trans-log cost function 
with three input prices. 
(Leon, 2015; Meslier et al., 
2017) 
Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
AltLernerMktjt An alternative measurement of 
the Lerner index. It is a weighted 
average of banks’ Lerner index 
that is calculated using the trans-
log cost function with two input 
prices. 
(Fu et al., 2014) Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
HSTATjt H-statistic derived from the 
Panzar and Rosse model. 
(Turk-Ariss, 2010a) Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
NIMit-1 Lag value of net interest margins 
to proxy banks’ profitability. It 
is a ratio of net interest income 
to total earning assets. 
(Fu et al., 2014; Trinugroho et 
al., 2014) 
Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
LLRit-1 Lag value of the ratio of loan 
loss reserve to total assets to 
measure credit risk. 
(Soedarmono et al., 2011) Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
EQTAit-1 Lag value of the capital asset 
ratio to measure banks’ 
solvency. 
(Abedifar et al., 2013; 
Schliephake, 2016) 
Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
Sizeit-1 Lag value of the natural 
logarithm of total assets to 
measure banks’ size. 
(Cihak and Hesse, 2010) Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
HHIjt Herfindahl Hirschman index to 
proxy market concentration. 
(Berger et al., 2009) Bankscope, 
Authors calculation 
INFLjt Inflation (Soedarmono et al., 2011) World bank 
GGDPjt Growth of GDP (Soedarmono et al., 2011) World bank 
Crisisjt Crisis (Cihak and Hesse, 2010) 
 
Lawjt The rule of law index. Ranges 
from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, 2005) Worldwide 
governance 
indicator (WGI) 
dataset 
GovEffjt Government efficiency index. 
Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong). 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, 2005) Worldwide 
governance 
indicator (WGI) 
dataset 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LnZit 3892 1.6171 0.5584 0.2812 3.1734 
LnAltZ 3892 1.6405 0.4996 0.7014 3.0557 
LernerMktjt 3892 0.2833 0.1094 -0.0215 0.5931 
AltLernerMktjt 3890 0.2656 0.1601 -0.3203 0.4709 
HSTATjt 3022 0.4359 0.1854 0.0911 0.8424 
NIMit-1 3892 0.0380 0.0253 -0.0144 0.2118 
LLRit-1 3892 0.0529 0.0684 0.0008 0.4737 
EQTAit-1 3892 0.1314 0.0871 0.0368 0.5028 
Sizeit-1 3892 14.7372 2.0117 9.6159 19.7465 
HHIjt 3892 0.1359 0.0823 0.0425 0.7715 
INFLjt 3892 0.0672 0.0650 -0.2422 0.3742 
GGDPjt 3892 0.0191 0.0357 -0.1734 0.1431 
Crisisjt 3892 0.1680 0.3739 0.0000 1.0000 
Lawjt 3892 0.1957 0.9217 -1.7715 1.8869 
GovEffjt 3892 0.3555 0.8802 -1.5569 1.9000 
Note: Please see Table 2 for the variable descriptions. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) LnZit 1          
(2) LernerMktjt 0.269 1         
(3) NIMit-1 0.329 0.012 1        
(4) LLRit-1 0.161 -0.034 0.082 1       
(5) EQTAit-1 0.832 0.167 0.243 0.224 1      
(6) Sizeit-1 -0.382 0.119 -0.280 -0.232 -0.401 1     
(7) HHIjt 0.033 -0.056 -0.016 0.131 0.029 -0.100 1    
(8) INFLjt 0.118 0.018 0.191 0.074 0.052 -0.167 0.045 1   
(9) GGDPjt -0.037 -0.095 0.130 -0.017 -0.059 -0.120 -0.022 0.158 1  
(10) Crisisjt -0.020 -0.041 0.027 -0.059 -0.013 0.026 -0.047 -0.020 -0.370 1 
Note: Please see Table 2 for the variable descriptions. 
 
The prior literature also considers the possible endogeneity problem between banks’ 
market power and stability (Beck et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2004; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010; 
among others). On the one hand, a bank with a high degree of market power will also have 
better stability because they are able to determine the price of their product, which is far from 
their marginal cost. On the other hand, if a bank increases its risk-taking, they will have a higher 
expected return, which can be converted into higher market power. To address this issue, we 
will also estimate equation (5) using two-stages least squares (2SLS). Three instruments are 
used: the lagged value of our competition proxy (LernerMKTjt-1), the rule of law index (Lawjt), 
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and government efficiency (GovEffjt). Lawjt and GovEffjt are compiled by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010, 2005) and have also been used by Cihak and Hesse (2010) to manipulate market 
competition.7 These variables are available online in the World Governance Indicator (WGI) 
dataset.8   
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Baseline regression 
We estimate equation (5) to test the competition-stability nexus in a banking market 
that adopts a dual banking system. We provide the result in Table 5. In column (1), using the 
fixed-effect technique, we find a positive sign of the country-level Lerner index (LernerMkt), 
indicating that the higher banks’ market power on average (lower competition) is associated 
with higher banks’ stability. This result is confirmed in column (2) when we use the 2SLS 
estimator. The significant value of LernerMkt is supported by tests of weak identification and 
over-identification of the instruments we use. We see that the Kleibergen-Paap F Statistics are 
highly significant (272.6***), confirming that instruments we use in this study are strong 
enough to explain LernerMkt. The non-significant value of the Hansen J-Statistics (0.147) 
suggests that our instruments are valid (not correlated with the error term). 
Our finding therefore supports the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis, in line with Kabir 
and Worthington (2017). In dual banking markets, Islamic banks have to compete with both 
Islamic and conventional banks. Likewise, conventional banks also compete with their 
conventional and Islamic peers. This condition implies that the degree of competition in the 
dual banking market has been relatively high. Some studies either indirectly or directly show 
that heightened competition in the dual market influences Islamic or conventional banks’ 
behavior. For instance, Cihak and Hesse (2010) highlight that a higher presence of Islamic 
banks in banking sectors tends to weaken Islamic banks’ own stability. As a response to the 
competitive pressure of conventional banks, other studies show that Islamic banks adjust their 
rates of deposit for the sake of competition (Charap and Cevik, 2015; Chong and Liu, 2009; 
Ito, 2013; Saraç and Zeren, 2014). On the other hand, another study reports that conventional 
banks’ efficiency is also affected by the presence of large Islamic banks in the market (Abedifar 
et al., 2016). Meslier et al. (2017) document that conventional banks’ deposits in the dual 
                                                     
7 The government effectiveness index has also been used by Doumpos et al. (2017) as a determinant of the 
financial strength index. Similar to Cihak and Hesse (2010), Soedarmono et al. (2011) also use rule of law for 
instrument market competition. 
8 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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banking market are influenced by Islamic banks’ market power. Meslier et al. (2017) also argue 
that conventional banks’ response to Islamic banks’ competitive pressure could jeopardize their 
financial stability, especially when they intend to offer higher deposit rates than when their 
market power is lower. 
 
Table 5. Banks’ stability in the dual banking market 
 
                               FE 2SLS 
                               (1) (2) 
LernerMktjt                      0.449*** 0.491*** 
                               (4.44) (3.07) 
NIMit-1                          1.731*** 1.720*** 
                               (3.49) (3.39) 
LLRit-1                          0.158 0.161 
                               (1.05) (1.34) 
EQTAit-1                         3.284*** 3.283*** 
                               (18.79) (18.93) 
Sizeit-1                         -0.0652*** -0.0660*** 
                               (-3.62) (-4.16) 
HHIjt                            -0.624*** -0.618*** 
                               (-3.97) (-4.94) 
INFLjt                           0.287*** 0.287*** 
                               (3.06) (3.14) 
GGDPjt                           0.280 0.265* 
                               (1.56) (1.81) 
Crisisjt                         0.0432 0.0402 
                               (1.33) (1.31) 
N obs                              3892 3892 
N group                            490 490 
R-sq.                           0.339  
KP F-Stat.                       272.6*** 
Hansen J-Stat.                   0.147 
Notes: This table provides the estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect (FE) and two-stages 
least squares (2SLS) techniques. The validity of the instruments is tested using KP (Kleibergen Paap) 
F-Statistics and Hansen J-Statistics. Please refer to Table 2 for a description of the variables. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Turning to the control variables, we observe the significant result of NIM, EQTA, Size, 
HHI, and INFL. NIM positively affects banks’ stability, meaning that the higher profitability 
of banks will reduce banks’ fragility. Banks that can generate more money from their 
investment and lending activities will be more stable. EQTA is positively related to stability. 
Banks with more capital ratio, possibly with a higher capital buffer, will be less likely to fail 
when facing intensified competition in the dual market. Size shows a negative sign, suggesting 
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that banks in the dual market are more stable when they are small. Small banks might be more 
conservative, whereas larger banks may take more risks. The negative sign is also shown by 
HHI. In a market with a high concentration (high HHI), banks’ stability will be reduced. This 
suggests that high concentration is not associated with low competition, a similar finding to Fu 
et al. (2014). Inflation surprisingly shows a positive impact on banks’ stability. It might be 
associated with the rate offered to clients by the banks. In a high inflation period, banks charge 
high rates from their customers. The interest income will therefore increase, in addition to the 
profitability. This condition will result in a lower volatility of profitability (better stability).  
 
3.2. Islamic and conventional banks subsample 
Since prior studies highlight the possible differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks’ stability (Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Cihak and Hesse, 2010, among others), 
we are interested in seeing whether the impact of competition is also different between two 
bank types. We then estimate equation (5) within each type of bank separately. The results are 
presented in Table 6.  
The results in column (1) and (2) indicate that market competition in the dual banking 
system is not important for Islamic banks’ stability. On the other hand, we see that market 
competition still erodes conventional banks’ stability, as displayed in columns (3) and (4). Our 
results are robust across the estimation techniques (FE and 2SLS) we use. 
As documented by Meslier et al. (2017), the way in which Islamic banks compete in 
the dual banking market is not necessarily similar to that of conventional banks. Meslier et al. 
(2017) show a form of asymmetric competition in which Islamic banks only compete with 
other Islamic banks but conventional banks compete with both Islamic and conventional banks. 
This is because the existence of Islamic banks is mainly to fulfill the need of religious 
customers who hesitate to use conventional banking products (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; 
Gheeraert, 2014). Conventional banks will face difficulties in finding religious depositors even 
after reducing their prices. Conversely, Islamic banks are able to attract both religious and 
conventional (non-religious) clients, especially when Islamic banks provide better prices. Ariff 
(2014) highlights that Islamic banks at present do not only focus on Muslims. Some Islamic 
banks even have non-Muslim clientele at approximately 40% (Ariff, 2014). 
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Table 6. The impact of market competition on Islamic and conventional banks’ stability. 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 FE 2SLS FE 2SLS 
                               (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LernerMktjt                      0.189 0.325 0.492*** 0.448** 
                               (0.95) (0.70) (4.49) (2.49) 
NIMit-1                          -0.462 -0.481 2.259*** 2.275*** 
                               (-0.56) (-0.33) (3.60) (4.30) 
LLRit-1                          0.249 0.250 0.198 0.195 
                               (0.84) (1.13) (1.20) (1.44) 
EQTAit-1                         3.471*** 3.476*** 3.128*** 3.131*** 
                               (9.52) (10.10) (15.85) (15.77) 
Sizeit-1                         -0.0338 -0.0305 -0.0703*** -0.0693*** 
                               (-0.69) (-0.82) (-3.53) (-3.92) 
HHIjt                            -0.488** -0.520*** -0.795*** -0.815*** 
                               (-2.58) (-2.81) (-3.15) (-3.77) 
INFLjt                           0.612*** 0.611*** 0.146* 0.146* 
                               (3.01) (3.12) (1.71) (1.74) 
GGDPjt                           0.664* 0.626* 0.115 0.133 
                               (1.89) (1.95) (0.66) (0.88) 
Crisisjt                         0.111 0.0921 0.0319 0.0344 
                               (1.24) (0.98) (0.90) (1.05) 
N obs.                              640 640 3252 3252 
N banks                         100 100 390 390 
R-sq                           0.410  0.342  
KP F-Stat.                       25.01***  258.5*** 
Hansen J-Stat.                   0.347  0.201 
Notes: This table provides the estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect (FE) and two-stages 
least squares (2SLS) techniques. The validity of the instruments is tested using KP (Kleibergen Paap) F-
Statistics and Hansen J-Statistics. Please refer to Table 2 for a description of the variables. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.3. The different level of market competition 
Motivated by Gheeraert (2014), who finds that the Islamic banking sector plays a role 
as a complement in dual markets when the Islamic sector reaches a medium penetration level9, 
in this sub-section, we will investigate whether the impact of competition on Islamic and 
conventional banks’ stability will be different in the different level of market competitiveness. 
We divide our proxy of market competition (LernerMkt) into low (Low LernerMkt, below the 
                                                     
9 Accordingly, Imam and Kpodar (2013) also document that Islamic banks appear to complement rather than 
substitute for conventional banks. 
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25th percentile), medium (Medium LernerMkt, between the 25th and 75th percentile), and high 
(High LernerMkt, above 75th percentile). We regress the Islamic banks’ stability at each level 
of the Lerner index we create. The estimation results are presented in Table 7. The results 
suggest that the impact of market competition on banks’ stability depends on the intensity of 
the competition. However, this provides mixed results. We observe that especially in 
conventional banks’ cases, the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis only occurs when the degree 
of competition is high because a positive sign of our competition proxies appear only in 
columns (11) and (12). On the contrary, competition favors conventional banks’ stability at the 
low and medium competition levels, as displayed in columns (7) to (10). In the Islamic banks 
subsample, we also find some evidence in column (3) that banks’ stability increases as the 
market becomes more competitive. This result support ‘competition-stability’ view. Dual 
market competition could be an advantage for both Islamic and conventional banks because, 
according to Boyd and Nicoló (2005), it will force banks to offer a lower loan rate to the 
borrower. This condition will be good for banks’ stability because a lower loan rate will make 
entrepreneurs less eager to take excessive risks and thus increase the probability of 
entrepreneurs’ loan repayment (Boyd and Nicoló, 2005). However, note that the benefits of 
competition occur only at the low to medium competition level. At the high level, competition 
will deteriorate the banks’ stability. 
 
 
3.4. Further analysis: Capitalization, crisis, and size of banks. 
The preceding studies on financial stability underline the importance of bank 
capitalization, the financial crisis period, and bank size. Schliephake (2016) theoretically show 
that, by looking at the regulatory perspective, imposing capital requirements without 
considering the competitive environment can have adverse effects on stability. It is also 
documented that the competitive market does not play a role in well-capitalized banking sectors 
(Schliephake, 2016). In other words, bank capitalization moderates the impact of competition 
on bank stability. Therefore, we complement the theoretical work of Schliephake (2016) by 
testing whether there is a possible interaction effect between bank capitalization and 
competition regarding the competition-stability nexus. Our econometric setup is as follows. 
LnZROAit = α0 + β1LernerMktjt + β2EQTAit + β3LernerMktjt ∗ EQTAit + φXit−1 + γZjt
+ εi,t     …   (6) 
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Table 7. The impact of different market competition levels on banks’ stability 
 Islamic banks     Conventional banks  
                               FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS 
                               (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Low LernerMktjt                  0.0355 -0.0981     -0.0283* -0.179**     
                               (1.08) (-0.61)     (-1.84) (-2.18)     
Med LernerMktjt                   -0.0388* 0.138     -0.0201* -0.198   
                                 (-1.66) (0.51)     (-1.80) (-1.25)   
High LernerMktjt                    0.0300 0.269     0.0732*** 0.235*** 
                                   (0.77) (0.72)     (4.53) (2.80) 
NIMit-1                          -0.419 -0.484 -0.464 -0.336 -0.473 -0.762 2.394*** 2.172*** 2.458*** 2.656*** 2.409*** 2.350*** 
                               (-0.50) (-0.34) (-0.55) (-0.24) (-0.57) (-0.47) (3.71) (4.01) (3.75) (4.52) (3.74) (4.47) 
LLRit-1                          0.254 0.235 0.260 0.212 0.253 0.283 0.179 0.232* 0.167 0.148 0.187 0.226 
                               (0.87) (1.05) (0.87) (0.89) (0.86) (1.19) (1.08) (1.67) (1.00) (1.05) (1.13) (1.64) 
EQTAit-1                         3.478*** 3.425*** 3.501*** 3.331*** 3.481*** 3.617*** 3.148*** 3.081*** 3.165*** 3.194*** 3.140*** 3.095*** 
                               (9.58) (9.27) (9.63) (6.94) (9.53) (9.51) (15.80) (15.33) (15.61) (15.32) (15.59) (15.17) 
Sizeit-1                         -0.0403 -0.0333 -0.0381 -0.0397 -0.0366 -0.0218 -0.0624*** -0.0795*** -0.0593*** -0.0606*** -0.0680*** -0.0876*** 
                               (-0.85) (-0.90) (-0.80) (-1.02) (-0.75) (-0.55) (-3.15) (-4.11) (-2.99) (-3.35) (-3.39) (-4.29) 
HHIjt                            -0.409** -0.539** -0.446** -0.435*** -0.474** -0.722* -0.946*** -0.615** -1.043*** -1.354*** -0.975*** -0.902*** 
                               (-2.18) (-2.48) (-2.40) (-2.65) (-2.48) (-1.73) (-3.70) (-2.22) (-4.03) (-3.81) (-3.77) (-4.49) 
INFLjt                           0.630*** 0.569*** 0.648*** 0.491* 0.627*** 0.730*** 0.147* 0.137 0.157* 0.232** 0.175** 0.231** 
                               (3.11) (2.84) (3.18) (1.69) (3.09) (2.69) (1.72) (1.56) (1.86) (2.20) (2.06) (2.55) 
GGDPjt                           0.703** 0.751** 0.670* 0.882* 0.691** 0.490 0.328* 0.433*** 0.265 -0.119 0.202 -0.0343 
                               (1.99) (2.22) (1.88) (1.75) (1.99) (1.21) (1.94) (2.94) (1.56) (-0.31) (1.21) (-0.19) 
Crisisjt                         0.146* 0.115 0.129 0.168 0.124 0.0166 0.0491 -0.00527 0.0704** 0.168* 0.0730** 0.103*** 
                               (1.79) (1.42) (1.58) (1.62) (1.47) (0.09) (1.40) (-0.12) (1.97) (1.77) (2.04) (2.93) 
N obs.                              640 640 640 640 640 640 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 
N banks                            100 100 100 100 100 100 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-sq.                           0.410  0.411  0.410  0.335  0.335  0.340  
KP F-Stat.                      7.284***  1.689  1.809  24.47***  3.830***  27.08*** 
Hansen J-Stat.                  0.344  0.341  0.365  0.104  0.0369  0.738 
Notes: This table provides estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect (FE) and two-stages least squares (2SLS) techniques. The validity of the instruments is tested using KP (Kleibergen Paap) 
F-Statistics and Hansen J-Statistics. Please refer to Table 2 for a description of the variables. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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In studies on Islamic banks, another work by Cihak and Hesse (2010) shows the 
significance of banks’ size on Islamic banks’ stability. They document that Islamic banks are 
more stable when operating at a small scale and less stable when operating at a large scale. 
However, recently, Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017) find an opposite result. They suggest that larger 
Islamic banks are more stable, at least when they surpass a certain threshold size. To refine the 
two contradictory findings, we construct the following equation containing the interaction 
effect LernerMktjt*Sizeit. 
LnZROAit = α0 + β1LernerMktjt + β2Sizeit + β3LernerMktjt ∗ Sizeit + φXit−1 + γZjt
+ εi,t     …   (7) 
The next investigation in this section is about the banking crisis. Some studies claim 
that Islamic banks perform better during the financial crisis. Hasan and Dridi (2010) find that 
Islamic banks on average showed stronger resilience during the financial crisis. Accordingly, 
Beck et al. (2013) document that Islamic banks are less likely to disintermediate during the 
crisis. Alqahtani et al. (2016), using GCC data, highlight that Islamic banks are more cost 
efficient in comparison to conventional banks. Olson and Zoubi (2016) observe that Islamic 
banks initially weathered the onslaught of the global financial crisis better than their 
conventional peers. Farooq and Zaheer (2015) find that by using data from Pakistan, Islamic 
banks are more resilient during financial crises. We therefore construct the following equation 
to investigate specific effects of the financial crisis. 
LnZROAit = α0 + β1LernerMktjt + β2Crisisjt + β3LernerMktjt ∗ Crisisjt + φXit−1 + γZjt
+ εi,t     …   (8) 
Table 8 shows the impact of the above-mentioned three variables in the competition-
stability nexus. The result is as follows. First, from columns (1) and (7), the negative interaction 
coefficients suggest that bank capitalization (EQTA) reduces the impact of market competition 
on banks’ stability. In the marginal effect rows, we can also see that market competition has 
positively affected banks stability both in low and medium bank capitalization, but the 
coefficients become lower (Low 0.542*** > Medium 0.447***). The coefficient even becomes 
insignificant (0.0895) when EQTA is high, suggesting that the impact of market competition 
diminishes for banks with a high capital ratio. Our results are in line with Schliephake (2016). 
In other words, the detrimental impact of market competition can be reduced when banks 
possess a high capital ratio. This evidence is seen in conventional banks and in all samples. 
Second, regarding the impact of a financial crisis, in column (5), we find a little 
evidence that the crisis period moderates the impact of dual market competition on Islamic 
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banks’ stability (β3 = -0.457*), even though the impact of market competition is statistically 
insignificant, both in the crisis period (β1 + β3 = -0.240) and in the non-crisis period (β1 = 0.217). 
In the conventional bank subsample, although competition positively affects stability both in 
the crisis (β1 + β3 = 0.422***) and non-crisis periods (β1 = 0.499***), there is no statistical 
support that a crisis alters the competition-stability nexus (β3 = -0.0577). Our result generally 
supports the prior literature highlighting the superiority of Islamic banks during the crisis than 
conventional banks. 
Third, we find that a higher bank size will strengthen the detrimental impact of 
competition on banks’ stability. This is depicted in columns (3), (6) and (9). In the conventional 
bank sample, the marginal effect of coefficients increase in accordance with bank size (Low = 
0.390*** > Med = 0.485*** > High = 0.719***), suggesting that the detrimental impact will 
be higher when the bank size is larger. In Islamic banks, we only find a significant effect of 
competition when Islamic banks become large (β1 + β3 (High) = 0.678**). This partially 
confirms the previous findings of Cihak and Hesse (2010). They find that Islamic banks are 
better when operating at a small scale. 
 
3.5. Robustness checks 
To improve the validity of our results, some robustness tests are conducted in this work. 
First, we change our stability proxy by a Z-score measurement proposed by Lepetit and Strobel 
(2013). They claim that their method is more robust and free from potentially ‘spurious’ 
volatility related to the construction of time-varying Z-scores. This measure is calculated using 
mean and standard deviation estimates of ROA that are calculated over the full sample and 
combines these with the current values of CAR. The result is presented in Table 9. It still 
supports the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis. Second, as explained earlier, for a robustness 
check, we also use another non-structural measurement of competition: H-Statistic. Similar to 
the Lerner index, the greater value of the H-Statistic is associated with the more competitive 
market. We follow the method proposed by Turk-Ariss (2010) to compute H-Statistics. Our 
result, as depicted in table 10, is also similar. Third, instead of using three input cost functions 
to calculate the Lerner index, we use two input cost functions following Fu et al. (2014). In the 
emerging market studies, the two-cost function is more popular due to the data unavailability 
because it only needs the data of total interest expense (W1) and total noninterest expense (W2). 
However, our results remain unchanged using both the FE and 2SLS methods, as depicted in 
Table 11. 
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Table 8. Lerner index, capitalization, crisis, and size 
                               All sample Islamic banks Conventional banks 
                               (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LernerMktjt (β1)                      0.697*** 0.466*** -0.462 0.514* 0.217 -1.326 0.764*** 0.499*** -0.514 
                               (4.64) (4.53) (-0.86) (1.75) (1.07) (-1.17) (4.71) (4.47) (-0.89) 
EQTAit-1 (β2)                         3.835*** 3.284*** 3.272*** 4.295*** 3.482*** 3.491*** 3.712*** 3.126*** 3.107*** 
                               (11.77) (18.82) (18.71) (7.21) (9.58) (9.73) (10.23) (15.86) (15.72) 
Crisisjt (β2)                         0.0440 0.0896** 0.0433 0.137 0.250** 0.0843 0.0315 0.0482 0.0332 
                               (1.36) (2.06) (1.34) (1.50) (2.10) (0.95) (0.89) (1.05) (0.94) 
Sizeit-1 (β2)                         -0.0639*** -0.0658*** -0.0843*** -0.0408 -0.0329 -0.0658 -0.0689*** -0.0706*** -0.0911*** 
                               (-3.56) (-3.65) (-3.93) (-0.88) (-0.68) (-1.17) (-3.49) (-3.54) (-3.88) 
LernerMkt*EQTA (β3)           -2.038**   -2.449   -2.284**   
                               (-2.25)   (-1.60)   (-2.25)   
LernerMkt*Crisis (β3)           -0.163   -0.457*   -0.0577  
                                (-1.57)   (-1.82)   (-0.56)  
LernerMkt*Size (β3)            0.0629*   0.111   0.0681* 
                                 (1.79)   (1.43)   (1.81) 
Marginal effect          
β1 + β3 (Low) 0.542***  0.373*** 0.328  0.143 0.590***  0.390*** 
                       (4.98)  (3.20) (1.48)  (0.67) (5.04)  (3.06) 
β1 + β3 (Med)  0.477***  0.461*** 0.250  0.297 0.518***  0.485*** 
                       (4.73)  (4.58) (1.23)  (1.54) (4.74)  (4.39) 
β1 + β3 (High) 0.0895  0.677*** -0.216  0.678** 0.0832  0.719*** 
                      (0.48)  (4.57) (-0.70)  (1.97) (0.39)  (4.49) 
Wald test          
β1 + β3  0.303**   -0.240   0.442***  
                       (2.34)   (-0.78)   (3.27)  
N obs.                              3892 3892 3892 640 640 640 3252 3252 3252 
N banks.                            490 490 490 100 100 100 390 390 390 
R-sq.                          0.341 0.340 0.340 0.414 0.415 0.413 0.344 0.342 0.343 
Notes: This table provides estimation results for equations (6), (7), and (8) using the fixed effect (FE) technique. Please refer to Table 2 for a 
description of the variables. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Robustness: Alternative proxy of Z-Score (LnAltZit) following Lepetit and Strobel 
(2013) 
 
 All sample Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS 
                               (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LernerMktjt                      0.301*** 0.437*** 0.110 0.161 0.361*** 0.503*** 
                               (3.84) (3.35) (0.64) (0.43) (4.33) (3.28) 
NIM                          0.961** 0.927** -0.450 -0.457 1.293*** 1.242*** 
                               (2.53) (2.43) (-0.77) (-0.69) (2.62) (2.81) 
LLR                          0.274** 0.282*** 0.212 0.212 0.331** 0.340*** 
                               (2.29) (2.86) (1.01) (1.38) (2.48) (3.01) 
EQTA                         3.223*** 3.218*** 3.360*** 3.362*** 3.044*** 3.034*** 
                               (19.96) (21.31) (11.20) (13.47) (16.40) (17.07) 
Size                         -0.0490*** -0.0515*** 0.0270 0.0282 -0.0649*** -0.0681*** 
                               (-3.05) (-3.84) (1.23) (1.30) (-3.84) (-4.46) 
HHIjt                            -0.369*** -0.351*** -0.265* -0.277* -0.549*** -0.487*** 
                               (-3.22) (-3.68) (-1.94) (-1.86) (-2.99) (-2.82) 
INFLjt                           0.197*** 0.196*** 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.165*** 0.164*** 
                               (3.48) (3.46) (2.89) (3.09) (2.75) (2.59) 
GGDPjt                           0.0320 -0.0135 0.243 0.229 -0.0473 -0.103 
                               (0.28) (-0.13) (1.40) (1.02) (-0.35) (-0.84) 
Crisisjt                         0.0661*** 0.0566** 0.0632 0.0561 0.0630** 0.0551** 
                               (2.60) (2.30) (0.97) (0.74) (2.32) (2.12) 
N obs.                              3892 3892 640 640 3252 3252 
N banks.                            490 490 100 100 390 390 
R-sq.                           0.421  0.519  0.419  
KP F-Stat.                      180.2***  14.76***  175.6*** 
Hansen J-Stat.                   0.487  0.166  0.218 
Notes: This table provides estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect (FE) and two-stages least 
squares (2SLS) techniques. The validity of the instruments is tested using KP (Kleibergen Paap) F-Statistics 
and Hansen J-Statistics. Please refer to Table 2 for a description of the variables. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Robustness: Using H-Statistics from the Panzar-Rosse model 
 
 All samples Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS 
                               (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HSTATjt                  0.0748*** 0.682*** 0.00153 1.271 
0.0759**
* 0.443** 
                               (2.76) (2.62) (0.02) (0.93) (2.70) (2.07) 
Lag NIM                          2.100*** 2.153*** -0.611 1.609 2.237*** 2.236*** 
                               (3.27) (3.72) (-0.35) (0.49) (3.20) (3.83) 
Lag LLR                          0.372** 0.307* 0.404 0.0878 0.377** 0.330** 
                               (2.07) (1.93) (1.08) (0.16) (2.02) (1.98) 
Lag EQTA                         3.164*** 3.238*** 3.103*** 3.843*** 3.126*** 3.151*** 
                               (15.75) (16.24) (6.46) (4.32) (14.37) (15.16) 
Lag Size                         -0.0466** -0.0244 0.0131 0.0872 -0.0478** -0.0380* 
                               (-2.17) (-1.10) (0.24) (0.77) (-2.13) (-1.85) 
HHIjt                            -1.126*** -0.734*** -0.279 1.695 -1.249*** -1.042*** 
                               (-3.98) (-2.66) (-0.47) (0.76) (-4.15) (-4.34) 
INFLjt                           0.0932 0.0395 0.121 0.745 0.0985 0.0512 
                               (1.00) (0.37) (0.56) (0.95) (0.95) (0.45) 
GGDPjt                           0.384** 0.494*** 0.699** 0.665 0.372* 0.460** 
                               (2.07) (2.71) (2.31) (1.21) (1.71) (2.41) 
Crisisjt                         -0.0223 -0.0211 -0.00555 -0.341 -0.0226 -0.00772 
                               (-0.62) (-0.60) (-0.05) (-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.28) 
N obs.                              3022 3022 334 334 2688 2688 
N banks                            360 360 49 49 311 311 
R-sq.                           0.350  0.413  0.354  
KP F-Stat.                       8.253***  0.576  9.419*** 
Hansen J-Stat.                   0.166  0.455  0.0862 
Notes: This table provides the estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect (FE) and two-stages least 
squares (2SLS) techniques. The validity of the instruments is tested using KP (Kleibergen Paap) F-Statistics 
and Hansen J-Statistics. Please refer to Table 2 for a description of the variables. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Robustness: Alternative proxy of LernerMkt using a two-factor input price following 
Fu et al. (2014) 
 
 All sample Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS 
                               (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AltLernerMktjt                      0.238*** 0.322*** 0.0641 0.253 0.332*** 0.316*** 
                               (2.82) (3.28) (0.42) (1.12) (3.60) (2.91) 
Lag NIM                          1.805*** 1.792*** -0.430 -0.407 2.341*** 2.346*** 
                               (3.60) (3.55) (-0.52) (-0.29) (3.67) (4.44) 
Lag LLR                          0.117 0.113 0.233 0.235 0.150 0.151 
                               (0.77) (0.94) (0.79) (1.06) (0.90) (1.11) 
Lag EQTA                         3.304*** 3.305*** 3.506*** 3.542*** 3.129*** 3.130*** 
                               (18.70) (18.94) (9.23) (9.96) (15.64) (15.74) 
Lag Size                         -0.0615*** -0.0630*** -0.0379 -0.0340 -0.0677*** -0.0673*** 
                               (-3.42) (-4.01) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-3.39) (-3.84) 
HHIjt                            -0.673*** -0.667*** -0.446** -0.483*** -0.931*** -0.936*** 
                               (-3.96) (-5.39) (-2.43) (-3.11) (-3.63) (-4.68) 
INFLjt                           0.279*** 0.275*** 0.609*** 0.604*** 0.128 0.129 
                               (2.97) (3.03) (3.00) (3.10) (1.50) (1.54) 
GGDPjt                           0.307* 0.260* 0.661* 0.561* 0.129 0.139 
                               (1.68) (1.76) (1.79) (1.72) (0.75) (0.91) 
Crisisjt                         0.0543 0.0471 0.127 0.101 0.0358 0.0369 
                               (1.64) (1.59) (1.51) (1.27) (0.99) (1.16) 
N obs.                              3890 3890 639 639 3251 3251 
N banks                            490 490 100 100 390 390 
R-sq.                           0.336  0.409  0.339  
KP F-Stat.                      292.6***  33.87***  309.8*** 
Hansen J-Stat.                  0.168  0.341  0.241 
Notes: This table provides the estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect (FE) and two-stages least 
squares (2SLS) techniques. The validity of the instruments is tested using KP (Kleibergen Paap) F-Statistics 
and Hansen J-Statistics. Please refer to Table 2 for a description of the variables. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the role of competition on the stability of Islamic and 
conventional banks in countries where the two banks operate alongside one another. This work 
is motivated by the heightened competitive condition in the dual market that may encourage 
either Islamic or conventional banks’ willingness to take excessive risks. This condition might 
jeopardize their stability, as suggested in some studies. To investigate the issue, we use a 
sample of 490 Islamic and conventional banks from 19 countries. We employ a market-level 
Lerner index to proxy market competitiveness and the Z-score to measure banks’ stability. Our 
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main result shows that market competition erodes banks’ stability, giving support to the 
‘competition-fragility’ nexus. This condition is robust after controlling for bank and country-
specific variables. Our result also remains consistent across the estimation techniques we use. 
In the second analysis, however, we find that the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis does not 
hold for Islamic banks. The effect of competition on Islamic banks is missing. On the other 
hand, Islamic banks are not affected by competitive pressure in the dual market, possibly 
because of the religious clients they have. In addition, when we repartition our competition 
variable into low, medium, and high, we find that the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis only 
occurs in the high competition market. Competition can favor financial stability, especially 
when they are at low or medium levels. 
In a further analysis, we find that the detrimental impact of market competition can be 
reduced when banks possess a high capital ratio, especially for conventional banks. We also 
find a negative impact of bank size on the ‘competition-fragility’ nexus. The adverse impact of 
competition will be stronger for large banks than small banks. It appears that banks in the dual 
market are better operating at a small scale. Last, we find little evidence that a crisis period 
moderates the impact of dual market competition on Islamic banks’ stability. Islamic banks 
appear to be stronger than conventional banks during a crisis period, as also suggested by some 
prior studies. 
This chapter offers two policy implications. First, both regulators and supervisors 
should carefully monitor competitive conditions in the dual market to avoid excessive risk 
taking from either Islamic or conventional banks. Second, it might be necessary for each 
country adopting a dual banking system to establish an institution specifically focusing on 
Islamic bank development. By doing this, the development of Islamic banks could be 
monitored more efficiently. Thus, Islamic banks could serve as a complement for conventional 
banks, and therefore, greater financial inclusion can be achieved. 
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Chapter 3 
Islamic banks’ equity financing, Shariah supervisory board, and banking 
environments 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although equity financing is a core value in Islamic finance, it is rarely used by Islamic banks 
which prefer other instruments such as markup or leasing contracts. The purpose of this chapter 
is to investigate the potential determinants of equity financing. Shariah supervisory board 
(SSB) is regarded as crucial in promoting equity financing. We use hand-collected data on 
equity financing and governance structure of 88 Islamic banks in 16 countries between 2009 
and 2014. Our findings reveal that Islamic banks’ equity financing is influenced by the 
characteristics of SSB. Specifically, the duality of SSB members positively affects equity 
financing whereas the existence of a Shariah department within banks has a negative impact. 
We also find that the role of SSB in Islamic banks is influenced by the characteristics of the 
board of directors (BOD) and the banking environments. The impact of SSB on equity 
financing is reduced in the better banking environment, possibly suggesting substitution role 
between SSB and institutional and Islamic environment. 
 
Keywords: Profit and loss sharing, equity financing, governance, Shariah supervisory board, 
environment, Islamic banks 
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1. Introduction 
Islamic banking has expanded rapidly in the last decades. Islamic banks play a major 
in the Muslim-dominated countries, but they also operate in some European countries (United 
Kingdom, France, Luxembourg) and South Africa even though those countries have a 
relatively low share of Muslim population (Hussain and Turk-Ariss, 2015). Islamic banks are 
projected to grow side-by-side with conventional banks to promote economic development and 
financial inclusion. This is because Islamic banks mainly target Muslims who decline 
conventional finance because of religious beliefs. Kammer et al. (2015) argue that Islamic 
banks have the potential for further contribution to the economy at least in three dimensions. 
First, they could foster greater financial inclusion as they target unbanked Muslims. Second, 
Islamic banks emphasize on asset-backed financing and risk-sharing features that can support 
the growth of small and medium enterprises (SME). Third, the risk-sharing nature of contracts 
and the prohibition of speculation imply that Islamic banks may pose less systemic risk than 
conventional banks. 
Risk sharing is one of the main principles of Islamic banks (Ibrahim and Alam, 2017). 
It is embedded in the profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts where any profit and losses will 
be shared between the banks and entrepreneurs or depositors. The relationship between banks 
and clients is therefore not debt-based but equity-based. Through the PLS principle, on the 
liability side, Islamic banks act as a fund manager while depositors are considered as investors 
or investment account holders. Unlike conventional depositors, Islamic depositors cannot claim 
a fixed return because this return will depend on the banks’ ex-post profit from financing 
activities. Oppositely, on the asset side, Islamic banks act as investors who provide funds to 
their clients who will share ex-post profit or losses from their business activities with the bank. 
This mechanism, therefore, is viewed as the backbone of Islamic banking activities making 
Islamic banking different from conventional banking because of the prohibition of interest. 
However, after more than three decades of operation, the risk sharing features are not 
successfully applied in most of the Islamic banking activities. The proportion of Islamic 
deposits using PLS arrangements is diminishing (Islamic Financial Service Board, 2016) while 
Islamic financing with risk-sharing features (PLS financing or equity financing) are rarely used 
due to their complexities. Abedifar et al. (2013) mention that, for example, to employ equity 
financing, Islamic banks need to discuss and determine a pre-agreed sharing ratio with the 
entrepreneurs. This can be very complicated because clients’ characteristics (especially for 
small businesses who cannot obtain a loan from conventional banks, therefore, seeking equity 
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financing) are usually opaque and difficult to quantify (Aysan et al., 2017). Equity financing 
also implies that bank’s return is not guaranteed and this could have a detrimental effect on the 
stability of Islamic banks (Hamza and Saadaoui, 2013). The complexity of Islamic banks’ 
financial products especially equity financing is exacerbated by the lack of regulatory 
harmonization between countries (Kammer et al., 2015). Although specific standards have 
been developed by specialized standard-setting bodies, Kammer et al. (2015) argue that in 
many jurisdictions regulators do not grasp the unique risks inherent in the PLS mechanism or 
other Islamic banks’ products. 
Nevertheless, although the principles of equity financing are difficult to apply in 
practice in the real banking world today, some banks do actually use such mechanisms possibly 
because it allows them to diversify their asset portfolio. Moreover, in some countries, equity 
financing is significantly present. For example, the Indonesian Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat, 
provides 39 percent of its lending in the form of PLS contracts but 56 percent of its lending in 
the form of murabaha agreement (Wolters, 2005, in Visser, 2009). This is in line with Abedifar 
et al. (2013) who highlight that PLS mode of finance in Indonesia accounted for more than 
30% of total financing provided by Islamic banks, pointing out that PLS method in Indonesia 
is among the highest compared to other countries.  El-Hawary et al. (2007) document that, in 
Sudan, musharaka-based financing ranges between 23 and 32 percent and mudaraba-based 
financing between 4.6 and 5.7 percent respectively. Additionally, Khan (1995) highlight that 
in Iran, PLS financing represents 37% of Islamic banks’ assets. Therefore, why some Islamic 
banks extensively use this type of contract while others definitely prefer non-equity financing 
remain a puzzle. 
In this study, we investigate the determinants of PLS practice in Islamic banks. 
Surprisingly, the empirical works in the area of Islamic lending or financing are very sparse. 
Prior literature has put much attention on the liability side of banks' balance sheets and 
specifically on Islamic depositors, the so-called investment account holders (e.g., Cevik and 
Charap, 2011; Chong and Liu, 2009; Ergeç and Arslan, 2013; Haron et al., 2008; Ito, 2013; 
Meslier et al., 2017; Saraç and Zeren, 2014) where most of them conclude little differences 
between Islamic and conventional deposits. Even though some empirical papers focus on the 
financing or lending of Islamic banks (e.g., Abdul Karim et al., 2014; Amidu and Wolfe, 2013; 
Aysan et al., 2017; Caporale et al., 2016; Ibrahim, 2016; Minhat and Dzolkarnaini, 2017), 
works which focus on PLS or equity financing are very limited. Most of the papers concentrate 
on the theoretical features of equity financing and its implementation in practice  (e.g., Abdul-
Rahman et al., 2014; Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). To the best of our knowledge, Alam and 
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Parinduri (2017) is the only study who empirically investigate equity financing in Islamic 
banks. They examine whether equity financing activities in Islamic banks is influenced by the 
characteristics of the institutional environment. The authors highlight that better institutional 
environment does not significantly influence the use of equity financing by Islamic banks. 
In this work, we conjecture that Islamic banks' governance characteristics, particularly 
the presence and characteristics of Shariah board or of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), play 
a vital role in determining the extent of equity-based financing. Indeed, Islamic banks has a 
different organizational structure than conventional banks with a ‘multi-layer’ governance 
system (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) which may lead to different agency conflicts between bank’s 
stakeholder than in conventional banks (Farag et al., 2017). While the first layer, the board of 
director (BOD), is the same than in conventional banks, the specific feature of Islamic banks’ 
governance is the existence of a second layer, the SSB. The former focuses on performance 
while the latter has a role in monitoring Shariah practices. The  SSB is composed of experts in 
Islamic jurisprudence who also have sufficient knowledge of contemporary finance (Hamza, 
2013) as well as accounting practices (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). They play a supervisory 
role to ensure that all the bank's products and services offered to customers and investors 
comply with the Shariah principles (Quttainah et al., 2013). This is generally accomplished by 
evaluating transactions made by the bank in one business year and releasing a Shariah report 
to stakeholders (in the Islamic banks’ annual report). The SSB also plays an advisory role in 
the Islamic banks. They could also provide some advice or recommendations to the BOD and 
the executive management (CEO) on all aspects related to the implementation of Shariah 
principles in the bank, including which contracts should be used or avoided (Ginena and 
Hamid, 2015; Quttainah et al., 2013; Song and Oosthuizen, 2014). In this sense, the SSB has a 
role in recalling BOD and management on the core of Islamic finance, ethics which translates 
into PLS arrangements (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). The SSB is hence expected to recommend 
less usage of markup financing because many Islamic scholars argue that markup financing 
could open a backdoor to interest (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Islamic banks should, in 
theory, possess attributes that are distinguishable from conventional financing instruments 
through PLS financing (Ayub, 2007; Minhat and Dzolkarnaini, 2017). 
In order to examine how the presence of SSB matters for Islamic banks’ equity 
financing, we focus on the impact of some SSB characteristics. The first characteristic we 
consider in this study is the size of SSB. AAOIFI as a standard-setting organization in Islamic 
financial institutions recommend Islamic banks to have at least three SSB members (Ginena 
and Hamid, 2015) but in practice, Islamic banks could have two, three, four, or more. On one 
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hand, having larger SSB could be beneficial for the banks because it will decrease Islamic 
banks’ agency costs (Farag et al., 2017), effectively monitor managers, deter earning 
managements (Quttainah et al., 2013), and increase the overall Islamic banks performance 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015). On the other hand, one might also argue that because a Shariah 
decision has to be made collectively, accomplishing this task is not easy when the number of 
SSB member is high. This is because each board member could come from a different 
background, countries, and school jurisprudence (El-Hawary et al., 2007; Hamza, 2013) and 
thus could have a different argument about Shariah practices. For example, some members 
might argue that equity financing is indispensable for Islamic banks while other members could 
promote the use of markup contracts, which is Sharia-compliant, to deal with banking market 
competition. Besides, other characteristics such as the duality of SSB and the existence of 
Shariah department could also influence the PLS activities in Islamic banks. Although SSB is 
expected to be independent in order to perform its duties independently (Ginena and Hamid, 
2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Safieddine, 2009), some Islamic banks in fact could have one 
or more SSB members who also sit in the BOD or who are executive member of the bank 
(Nathan Garas, 2012). It could be argued that this duality might trigger Islamic banks to 
decrease their PLS activities because SSB has lost their independence. Oppositely, SSB could 
also strongly influence BOD to use equity financing. More duality in Islamic banks could then 
favor the use of PLS activities. The third SSB characteristic we investigate in this chapter is 
the existence of Shariah department. Some Islamic banks establish a Shariah department in the 
banks with the purpose to assist SSB in conducting their duties. The impact of this department 
is also interesting to be taken into account because it could have two opposite effects. On the 
one hand, Shariah department could positively influence PLS activities including equity 
financing because since the department are working with the SSB, the implementation of SSB 
decisions on equity financing will also be more effective. On the other hand, because Shariah 
department members are hired by the banks as other employees, their independence to provide 
Shariah assistance might be questioned, and they might easily agree with BOD’s decision for 
not using equity financing. 
We use data on 88 Islamic banks across 16 countries for the 2007-2014 period.  For the 
purpose of our study, we manually collect data on equity financing and governance 
characteristics from annual reports. Our empirical investigation reveals that some 
characteristics of SSB significantly affect the extent to which equity financing is actually used 
by Islamic banks.  First, while the size of SSB does not significantly impact the extent of equity 
financing, the duality of SSB members (members who sit both in the BOD and in the SSB) 
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positively affects equity financing. This result might indicate that, when members of BOD are 
also members of SSB, they could have more influence on bank manager to use equity financing. 
Second, we also find that the existence of a Shariah department in Islamic banks negatively 
impacts equity financing. In line with Ginena and Hamid (2015), Shariah department members 
who are hired by the bank might face difficulties to provide an independent Shariah review 
and monitoring.  
We also further investigate whether the impact of SSB on equity financing might be 
influenced by other governance characteristics as well as banking environment. Although SSB 
is expected to be independent, SSB decision to promote or not equity financing might be 
influenced by the presence of BOD because SSB members are appointed by the BOD and are 
remunerated by the bank (Ginena and Hamid, 2015; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Hamza, 2013; 
Oseni et al., 2016). SSB’s role to promote PLS financing activities could also be altered by 
some characteristics of the banking environment such as the market share of Islamic banks in 
the country or the share of Muslims in the population. On the one hand, we might expect that 
the influence of SSB on the use of PLS in Islamic banks could be stronger in predominantly 
Muslim environments. On the other hand, stronger Islamic environment may also act as a 
substitute to SSB influence to promote equity financing. Moreover, in an environment 
characterized by higher asymmetric information, Islamic banks may be less eager to use PLS 
financing (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014). While we expect that in countries with a better 
institutional environment, Islamic banks might be more willing to use equity financing than in 
countries weaker institutional environment (Alam and Parinduri, 2017), we conjecture that the 
influence of SSB on bank’s decision to provide equity financing is stronger such environment.  
By providing a monitoring role of bank practices as well as some advice and recommendations 
to the BOD and the executive management (CEO) on the implementation of Shariah principles, 
SSB may reduce asymmetric information problems and then act as a substitute to the better 
institutional environment. 
Our results show that that the impact of SSB characteristics on equity financing is also 
affected by some of the characteristics of BOD. We also show that equity financing in Islamic 
banks could be altered by the condition of institutional and Islamic environments. In better 
environments, the impact of SSB on equity financing decrease, suggesting a substitute role of 
banking environment regarding its association with Islamic banks’ PLS lending activities. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study investigating equity financing and its relationship with the characteristics of SSB in 
Islamic banks. As explained earlier, the literature on equity financing is essentially normative 
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or theoretical. We fill the gaps by performing an empirical investigation based on a hand-
collected dataset of various types of Islamic financing instruments (mudaraba, musharaka, 
murabaha, etc.) and the characteristics of SSB. Second, whereas prior empirical work on equity 
financing only focuses on the impact of institutional settings (Alam and Parinduri, 2017), we 
complement our analysis by accounting for both the institutional and Islamic environment in 
which banks operate.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related 
literature. Section 3 presents the data and the econometric specification. Section 4 reports the 
estimation results. Further analyses are carried out in section 5. Section 6 provides some 
robustness checks and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Review of related literature 
2.1. Islamic banks’ financing contracts: a short overview 
Islamic banks conduct their financing activities in several ways. The different contracts 
are deep-rooted in Islamic law and applied in the contemporary banking world under different 
forms. On the whole, Islamic financing contracts can be divided into two categories: PLS (or 
equity) contracts and non-PLS (or non-equity) contracts. PLS consists either in mudaraba 
(profit-sharing) or musharaka (partnership) while non-PLS refers to murabaha (cost-plus 
financing), ijara (leasing), diminishing musharaka (partnership with gradual ownership 
process)1, qard (benevolent loan), and other contracts.2 
Mudaraba financing is considered as the main contract in Islamic banks which makes 
them different from conventional banks. The short translation of mudaraba is profit sharing 
because by using this contract, Islamic banks provide the fund (capital) for their clients to 
conduct their project and then any profit generated from the clients’ project will be shared 
between the bank and the client according to a pre-agreed ratio. In this case, Islamic banks act 
as a fund provider whereas clients are entrepreneurs. The second equity financing is 
musharaka. The idea behind musharaka is typically similar to mudaraba. The only difference 
is that in musharaka, both banks and clients contribute to the equity (capital) of the project. 
This is why it is called a ‘partnership’. Murabaha is a trade with mark up or cost-plus sale. The 
assets (either for business or consumption) are purchased on behalf of customers and resold at 
                                                     
1 Although it has word ‘musharaka’ (partnership), at the practice this contract is not used for productive financing 
(mostly for housing loans) and therefore never share any profit and loss. For this reason, diminishing musharaka 
are not considered in the equity financing. 
2 Salam, Istishna, Rahn, and many other contracts. 
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a pre-determined price. Clients therefore make a payment of the assets either in a lump sum or 
several installments. The bank holds the ownership of the assets until the full payments are 
made. Ijara is an operational or financial leasing contract. Banks purchase assets on behalf of 
the clients and allows clients to rent the assets for a fixed price. Even though the ownership 
remains at the financier it can also be transferred to the clients gradually. Diminishing 
musharaka is a financing contract where clients promise to buy the share of the assets 
(purchased by the bank on behalf the clients) gradually until the title of ownership of the assets 
is completely transferred to the clients. Qard is a benevolent loan or financing without interest. 
After using the funds, clients return them to the bank at a similar amount, without any additional 
fee or interest. This contract is usually used for a short-term loan granted to the banks’ 
employees. 
For various reasons, in today's banking world, most of the Islamic banks prefer to use 
Non-PLS financing. First, PLS contracts are vulnerable to agency problems as entrepreneurs 
might have less incentive to put more effort into their business and they are more likely to 
report lower profits, compared to self-financed entrepreneurs (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014; Dar 
and Presley, 2000). Second, Islamic banks have to sort many issues in the PLS arrangement: 
collateral, control, monitoring, etc. For instance, in mudaraba, banks do not have control rights 
over the assets given to the entrepreneur (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). Any losses from the 
project will be borne by the banks (El-Hawary et al., 2007).3 Even if, for instance, banks decide 
to use musharaka, banks need to spend more on monitoring cost in the entrepreneurs’ project. 
Third, PLS contracts require a well-defined contracting environment to function efficiently. 
Most Islamic banks operate in developing countries where financial markets are generally less 
transparent than in developed countries and prone to rent-seeking behavior (Abdul-Rahman et 
al., 2014; Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Alam and Parinduri, 2017; Dar and Presley, 2000). 
Markup contracts have therefore become solutions to the above-mentioned problems. 
Markup contracts allow Islamic banks to be less concerned with agency problems and 
asymmetric information (Shaban et al., 2014). Moreover, the markup contract, especially 
Murabaha, also called ‘collateral-by-contract’, allows entrepreneurs to obtain funds without 
providing any collateral (Shaban et al., 2014). This is because the banks retain ownership of 
the assets and can seize them in cases of default (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). 
 
                                                     
3 Except a loss caused by misconduct or negligence. 
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2.2. Islamic banks’ equity financing and the role of SSB 
Islamic banks in theory are part of an Islamic economic system. Errico and Farahbaksh 
(1998) indicate that: 
“To understand Islamic banking is to realize that its banks and their operations are considered 
to be an integral part of a complete economic system, which is based upon the codification of 
injunctions outlined in the Koran and the traditions of Prophet Mohammed, that is Islamic 
Shariah.” 
In theory, Islamic banks have a different objective than conventional banks. They are 
expected not simply to seek profits but also to promote social welfare and economic growth. 
The environment of Islamic banks is considered as a context where social solidarity and 
belonging to the community are center values (Daly and Frikha, 2016). Ethical behavior is 
expected to be at the root of Islamic banking, a key manifestation of which is the adoption of 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) schemes and the prohibition of interest (Mollah et al., 2016). The 
prohibition of interest is not an objective of Islamic banks. It is nevertheless a rule to help 
Islamic banks contribute to a world governed by Islamic principles (Weill, 2011). Therefore, 
in the Islamic financial system, Islamic banks should emphasize the use of PLS or equity 
contracts because they can better support entrepreneurs to create or run a business (Khan, 
1995). PLS is also one of the core elements of Islamic banking (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
PLS could also increase the value of Islamic banks and make them more resilient to crises 
(Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014). Even though non-PLS contracts especially markup contracts are 
allowed under Islamic law (Shariah compliant) their acceptability is questioned by some 
Islamic scholars because mark-up financing implies a fixed return for the bank (Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000). It is therefore argued that markup contracts should be avoided or at least 
restricted because markup financing could open a “back door” to interest (Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000) (Ayub, 2007; Minhat and Dzolkarnaini, 2017). Additionally, Islamic scholars 
are economically worried that markup financing may stunt economic growth by constraining 
entrepreneurs from investing in new projects (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). SSB is hence 
expected to play an important role to promote the use of PLS over markup contracts. 
The role of SSB is extremely important for Islamic banks and their existence along 
standard BOD makes their governance structure very different from those of conventional 
banks. Their function as a second layer in Islamic banks' organizational structure allows them 
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to monitor and supervise Islamic banks regarding Shariah implementation.4 Such function is 
vital to maintain clients’ confidence about Islamic banks’ activities since SSB confirms the 
compliance of these activities with Shariah or Islamic law (Abdullah et al., 2015). Failing to 
maintain this confidence could jeopardize the sustainability of Islamic banks because 
stakeholders (deposit account holders or shareholders) can withdraw their investments at any 
time (Ginena and Hamid, 2015; Quttainah et al., 2013). Moreover, according to Nathan Garas 
and Pierce (2010), the role of SSB in Islamic banks is not just monitoring or supervising but 
also advising Islamic banks in all of the Shariah-related matters. This advisory role could take 
to form of suggesting BOD or management which Islamic contracts should be used or avoided. 
This is because SSB has a supreme authority to cancel any product or investment that does not 
comply with Shariah, even though it could deprive Islamic banks from potential investment 
and reduces their market share (Nathan Garas and Pierce, 2010). SSB’s task also includes 
giving an opinion, for instance, to prohibit the bank engaging in a particular profitable 
transaction (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). Additionally, SSB could issue a recommendation on 
how the institution could best fulfill its social role as well as promote Islamic finance (Grais 
and Pellegrini, 2006) and make them different from the conventional counterparts (Mollah and 
Zaman, 2015). 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Sample 
For the purpose of our study, we use a hand-collected dataset combining data from 
various sources. We manually collect the data on equity financing and all governance variables 
from the Islamic banks’ annual reports. Other bank-specific data (balance sheet and income 
statement date) are collected from BankScope while country-level data are retrieved from the 
World Bank database, Pew Research Center, and the Heritage Foundation. Our dataset 
therefore is limited to the banks that: (1) report the types of Islamic financing in the annual 
reports; (2) have an SSB report and all related governance reports in their annual reports; (3) 
their data are available in BankScope. After winsorizing extreme values at the 1% and 99% 
levels, our final sample comprises 381 observations from 88 banks and 16 countries between 
                                                     
4 Grais and Pellegrini (2006) highlight five main roles of SSB: certifying permissible financial instruments 
through fatwa (ex-ante Shariah audit), verifying that transaction comply with issued fatwa (ex-post Shariah audit), 
calculating and paying Zakat, deposing non-Shariah compliant earning, and advising on the distribution of income 
or expenses among shareholders and investment account holders. 
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2007 and 2014. Table 1 presents our variables, their definition as well as their descriptive 
statistics. 
3.2. Equity financing across the sample 
Table 2 illustrates several types of financing contracts used by Islamic banks. Based on 
our sample, equity (PLS) financing which consists of mudaraba (trustee financing) and 
musharaka (equity participation) represents a tiny portion in Islamic banks’ financing 
portfolios. The average value of mudaraba is 2.7% while musharaka is 4.8%. Even though 
equity financing is not popular among Islamic banks, its proportion is substantially high in 
Indonesia (musharaka 30%), Iran (mudaraba 23%; musharaka 26%), and Yemen (mudaraba 
24%). Our statistics are consistent with those provided in Wolters (2005) in Visser (2009), 
Abedifar et al. (2013), and Khan (1995). Table 2 also shows that murabaha (markup contract/ 
resale with a stated profit) is the most popular type of financing in Islamic banking. Islamic 
banks, on average, allocate more than a half of their financing using murabaha contracts. Ijara 
(leasing) is the second most popular financing type of contract with average values reaching 
17% across our sample. 
3.3. Econometric specification  
In order to investigate how SSB characteristics influence equity financing in Islamic 
banks, we develop the following econometric model: 
𝐸𝑞𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.          (1) 
where i, j, and t represent bank, country, and time respectively. EqFin is our dependent variable. 
It is defined as the ratio of equity financing to total financing (EqFinTL). We also employ 
EqFinTA (equity financing to total assets) and EqFinNon (equity financing to non-equity 
financing) for robustness.  
SSB is a vector of variables which characterized the structure of SSB in Islamic banks. 
These characteristics encompass the size of SSB (Size_SSB) measured by the number of 
Shariah board members, the duality of SSB members (Duality_SSB) and the existence of a 
Shariah audit or Shariah department in Islamic banks (ShariahDept_SSB). We use a dummy 
variable for all three SSB variables. Specifically, Size_SSB is a dummy variable equals to 1 if 
the size of SSB is above its mean and 0 otherwise. The value of 1 in Duality_SSB  
(ShariahDept_SSB) refers to the existence of SSB member duality (the department of Shariah) 
within Islamic bank, whereas 0 otherwise.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and variable explanations 
Variable Explanation Sources N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Panel A: Dependent variables (Islamic banks’ equity financing)       
EqFinTL Ratio of equity financing to total financing Banks' annual report 381 0.076 0.148 0 0.781 
EqFinTA Ratio of equity financing to total assets Banks' annual report 381 0.052 0.107 0 0.524 
EqFinNon Ratio of equity financing to non-equity financing Banks' annual report 381 0.151 0.477 0 3.569 
Panel B: Governance variables       
Size_SSB Dummy variable equals to 1 if the number of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) member in the bank 
above its mean and 0 otherwise 
Banks' annual report 389 0.568 0.496 0 1 
Duality_SSB Dummy variable equals to 1 if one or more member of SSB are also BOD or executive member and 0 
otherwise 
Banks' annual report 388 0.124 0.330 0 1 
ShariahDept_SSB Dummy variable equals to 1 if an Islamic bank have a Shariah Department or Shariah Audit in their 
organizational structure and 0 otherwise 
Banks' annual report 387 0.382 0.487 0 1 
Size_BOD Dummy variable equals to 1 if the number of BOD member above its mean and 0 otherwise Banks' annual report 389 0.602 0.490 0 1 
Duality_BOD Dummy variable equals to 1 if one or more member of SSB are also Executive member and 0 
otherwise 
Banks' annual report 388 0.701 0.458 0 1 
Meeting_BOD Dummy variable equals to 1 if the number of BOD meetings above its mean and 0 otherwise Banks' annual report 289 0.332 0.472 0 1 
Indep_BOD Dummy variable equals to 1 if the number of independent BOD above its mean and 0 otherwise Banks' annual report 305 0.390 0.489 0 1 
Panel C: Institutional & Islamic environments       
ResInsolv Dummy variable equals to 1 if resolving insolvency index in the doing business index is above its 
mean and 0 otherwise 
Doing business index 
(The World bank) 389 0.620 0.486 0 1 
GetCredit Dummy variable equals to 1 if getting credit index in the doing business index is above its mean and 0 
otherwise 
Doing business index 
(The World bank) 389 0.617 0.487 0 1 
EnfContract Dummy variable equals to 1 if enforcing contract index in the doing business index is above its mean 
and 0 otherwise 
Doing business index 
(The World bank) 389 0.481 0.500 0 1 
StartBuss Dummy variable equals to 1 if starting a business index in the doing business index is above its mean 
and 0 otherwise 
Doing business index 
(The World bank) 389 0.676 0.469 0 1 
ShareIB Dummy variable equals to 1 if the share of Islamic banks in the market above its mean and 0 otherwise Bankscope, 389 0.201 0.401 0 1 
MPOP Dummy variable equals to 1 if the percentage of Muslims in the market above its mean and 0 otherwise CIA Worldfactbook 389 0.396 0.490 0 1 
Panel D: Bank-specific & country-specific variables       
ROA Return on assets (ratio of net income to total assets) to proxy profitability Bankscope 389 0.008 0.020 -0.139 0.062 
EQTA Equity to total assets to proxy solvency risk. Bankscope 389 0.152 0.114 0.052 0.651 
LLP Loan loss provision to total loan to proxy credit risk. Bankscope 389 0.016 0.049 -0.084 0.801 
Size Logarithm of banks’ size to proxy bank size Bankscope 389 14.849 1.501 10.650 18.045 
INFL Inflation The World Bank 389 0.061 0.091 -0.242 0.367 
GGDP Growth of GDP The World Bank 389 0.014 0.039 -0.173 0.094 
HHI Herfindahl Hischmann index to proxy market concentration. Bankscope 389 0.134 0.078 0.045 0.551 
GDP Gross Domestic Product The World Bank 389 25.538 1.145 23.011 28.603 
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Table 2. Percentage of Islamic financing (scaled by total financing) across countries 
  Equity (PLS) financing Mark-up and other (Non-PLS) financing 
Country # Banks Mudaraba Musharaka Murabaha Ijara Diminishing Musharaka Qard Others 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Bahrain 9 4.76 6.43 64.54 22.74 0.00 0.00 1.54 
Bangladesh 6 1.01 0.11 62.20 4.46 13.65 2.18 52.14 
Brunei Darussalam 1 0.00 0.46 83.80 10.49 0.00 0.04 78.03 
Indonesia 8 9.46 30.09 56.00 0.30 0.00 3.67 0.47 
Islamic Republic of Iran 4 23.01 25.82 15.32 1.16 9.11 2.27 11.95 
Jordan 3 0.28 0.54 68.90 28.12 0.00 0.27 1.90 
Kuwait 5 0.00 0.00 86.96 12.95 0.00 0.00 0.09 
Malaysia 17 0.11 3.90 48.05 24.20 0.00 0.04 56.19 
Pakistan 10 0.56 0.74 34.88 25.15 22.90 0.01 15.75 
Qatar 4 1.08 0.47 68.53 19.87 0.04 0.00 10.01 
Saudi Arabia 3 0.00 2.39 94.66 0.87 0.00 0.00 20.86 
Sudan 6 2.69 6.23 74.24 2.72 0.00 0.00 14.12 
Tunisia 1 0.00 0.00 70.56 1.59 0.00 0.17 27.68 
United Arab Emirates 6 5.13 3.06 54.29 24.34 0.00 0.89 12.30 
United Kingdom 4 0.44 0.66 87.79 1.26 0.00 0.00 9.85 
Yemen 1 24.25 8.04 57.64 1.38 0.00 0.00 8.69 
Total 88        
Average  2.77 4.88 57.99 17.29 3.78 0.43 23.38 
Note: mudaraba = profit-sharing; musharaka = partnership; murabaha = cost-plus financing; ijara = leasing; diminishing musharaka = partnership with gradual ownership process; qard = 
benevolent loan. 
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Prior literature uses SSB size to measure the strength of SSB (Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Size_SSB in this study is an indicator of how collective decision-
making is taken in Islamic banks. Banks that put more emphasis on collective decision-making 
related to Shariah issues should have a stronger tendency to use equity contracts rather than 
markup and other contracts. Nevertheless, we could also expect a negative impact of Size_SSB, 
because collective decision-making could take times or opinions could be very different 
because of a higher diversity of the board. As discussed in Goodstein et al. (1994), larger board 
are less likely to take strategic decisions due to the development of coalitions and factions.  
Duality_SSB indicates that one or more members of the SSB are also a board of director 
or executive board member. Such a situation could lead to a conflict of interest because the 
decision and review by the SSB should be independent from both management or the BOD 
(Ginena and Hamid, 2015). On the one hand, we might expect a negative impact of 
Duality_SSB since members who have a dual position could lose their independence regarding 
their Shariah role. In such cases, the SSB might be more inclined towards non-equity contracts 
since those contracts are also Shariah-compliant, safer and more appropriate either for the 
issuer (Islamic banks) or user (entrepreneurs). However, in the opposite, by having a dual 
position, SSB could strongly influence BOD policies including PLS activities because they are 
more able to influence the decision of bank’s managers to use PLS contracts. Therefore, 
Duality_SSB could either have a positive or a negative impact on the Islamic banks’ PLS 
financing activities. 
ShariahDept_SSB indicates if the bank has a Shariah department or has implemented a 
Shariah audit in Islamic banks. Some Islamic banks have this department mainly to assist SSB 
in ensuring Shariah compliance in Islamic banks (Ginena and Hamid, 2015). Unlike SSB that 
do not intensively monitor the banks, Shariah department can monitor Islamic banks regarding 
Shariah-related activities on the daily basis because Shariah department employees are hired 
by the bank for a long-term contract. Ginena and Hamid (2015) highlight that some duties of 
the Shariah department or Shariah audit are: (1) examine Shariah controls, level of compliance 
with SSB policies, procedures, and fatwa through objective Shariah audits; (2) participate in 
enhancing Shariah compliance, including training for the employees. Shariah department 
usually will give a monthly or quarterly report of Shariah practice to be evaluated by the SSB. 
The SSB therefore will provide an opinion on the report in order to inform the management 
whether their practices are complying to Shariah. Like SSB, Shariah department is also 
allowed to issue a fatwa. This function will be beneficial for Islamic banks because in the fluid 
business situations when Islamic banks need to develop a product to respond competitive 
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environment, they could ask Shariah department about the compliance of the product. This 
way will be better than asking fatwa from SSB because SSB members usually are very busy. 
Most of SSB members sit in more than one bank and hold many positions outside Islamic banks 
(Oseni et al., 2016). Therefore, since the Shariah department has a vital role to assist the SSB 
in conducting regular monitoring, we expect a positive coefficient for ShariahDept_SSB. 
Nevertheless, there could also be an adverse impact of Shariah department. As the members of 
Sharia department are banks’ employees, this might then be more difficult for them to provide 
independent monitoring or review. Shariah department decisions therefore could be influenced 
by the pressure from the bank’s management. In this case, Islamic banks could be exposed to 
fatwa risk or the occurrence that a fatwa is vague, incorrect, or complicated (Ginena and Hamid, 
2015). The incorrect fatwa definitely will affect Islamic banks’ reputation and it could also 
diminish stakeholders’ trust about the Shariah compliance.  
We also add several bank-specific control variables in our regressions. Except for 
banks’ size, all bank-level variables are lagged to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. 
ROA is the return on assets which is introduced as a proxy for profitability. Banks with higher 
profitability are more likely to have a solid balance sheet (Kim and Sohn, 2017) and therefore 
more inclined to diversify their financing portfolio by employing equity financing which is 
riskier. However, non-profitable banks could also be more eager to use such contracts to attract 
more entrepreneurs. This is because from the entrepreneurs’ point of view, equity contract is 
more attractive than debt contract, especially for those who just started a business (Khan, 1995). 
Small businesses usually have a high revenue volatility making them less eager to choose debt 
financing. By offering PLS financing, Islamic banks could also reach entrepreneurs who do not 
get access from the conventional credit (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Abedifar et al. (2013) 
note that Islamic banks could have greater credit risk than conventional banks due to the 
complexity of Islamic loan contracts, limited default penalties, and moral hazard incentives 
caused by PLS arrangements. We hence introduce LLP (ratio of loan loss provision to total 
loan) in our regressions to consider the impact of credit risk. A positive value of LLP means 
higher credit risk, and hence bank will decrease PLS lending activities. Nevertheless, in the 
dual banking market with a highly competitive pressure, banks with a greater credit risk could 
also be more willing to use equity financing to magnetize more customers. EQTA is the ratio 
of equity to total assets and taken into account to capture the impact of leverage. A higher value 
of EQTA will indicate higher lower solvency and might encourage banks to increase the 
proportion of equity financing because in such circumstances banks have an ability to increase 
risk-taking by using PLS contracts. Again, the opposite sign could also be expected. Islamic 
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banks with a better solvency could have less incentive to use equity financing. This is because 
they are less risky, and they do not need to use PLS contract to attract entrepreneur. Size is 
banks’ size, measured by the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets. We also expect a positive 
impact of Size, as Cihak and Hesse (2010) argue that the proportion of equity financing could 
be higher in large banks because they are usually less risky than small banks, enabling them to 
take more risk on PLS activities. However, smaller banks could also have higher PLS activities 
in order to attract more clients.  
We also control for the macroeconomic environment using inflation (INFL), the growth 
of gross domestic product/GDP (GGDP) and GDP. We also use the Herfindahl index (HHI) to 
control for market concentration. In the concentrated market, Islamic banks might decrease 
PLS financing because they face less competition, or because they do not need to attract 
customers or entrepreneurs using PLS. However, a negative association could also be expected 
since concentration is not always positively associated with market competition (e.g., see: 
Berger et al., 2009, 2004). 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents the regression results using equation (1). The size of SSB (Size_SSB) 
is not significant indicating that banks in which more members are appointed on the SSB do 
not behave differently than other banks regarding promoting PLS contracts. Conversely, the 
duality of SSB (Duality_SSB) has a positive impact on the proportion of equity financing, even 
though it is only significant at the 10% level. Banks in which one or more members sit on both 
the SSB and the BOD exhibit a higher share of equity financing. By also having a position on 
the BOD, SSB members will have more power to influence the decision of bank’s managers to 
use PLS contracts. The presence of a Shariah department (ShariahDept_SSB) in Islamic banks 
has a negative impact on the proportion of equity financing. Because Shariah department 
members are employed by the bank usually for a long contract (similar to other employees), it 
would also be difficult for them to provide independent Shariah monitoring. Therefore, a fatwa 
issued by Shariah department could be because of the pressure from the management or BOD. 
In this case, a fatwa risk, or the possibility that fatwa is incorrect, vague, or overly complicated 
will be higher. In the broader perspective, the fatwa risk could become the Shariah risk. Shariah 
risk is a form of operational risk, as the risk of financial losses that an Islamic bank may 
experience as a result of non-compliance with Shariah percepts in activities (Ginena, 2014). 
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Table 3. Impact of SSB on equity financing 
 
                                 EqFinTL EqFinTA EqFinNon 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Size_SSB                        0.0303   0.0195   0.0300   
                                 (1.53)   (1.43)   (0.59)   
Duality_SSB                        0.0748*   0.0376**   0.118*  
                                  (1.90)   (2.00)   (1.94)  
ShariahDept_SSB                      -0.0890***   -0.0375***   -0.316*** 
                                   (-4.61)   (-2.95)   (-8.69) 
Lag ROA                            -0.128 -0.0398 -0.102 -0.00338 0.0467 0.0165 -0.702 -0.585 -0.709 
                                 (-0.39) (-0.16) (-0.31) (-0.02) (0.31) (0.10) (-0.88) (-0.82) (-0.90) 
Lag EQTA                           -0.0281 -0.00370 -0.00493 -0.0504 -0.0353 -0.0361 -0.174 -0.147 -0.143 
                                 (-0.42) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-1.03) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-0.79) 
Lag LLP                            0.0570 0.0871 0.0611 0.0771 0.0930 0.0799 0.208 0.253 0.210 
                                 (0.46) (0.85) (0.49) (1.12) (1.44) (1.15) (0.80) (1.11) (0.83) 
Size                             0.0354 0.0405 0.0416 0.0247 0.0278 0.0281 0.0882 0.0940 0.100* 
                                 (1.50) (1.60) (1.63) (1.56) (1.63) (1.63) (1.52) (1.60) (1.73) 
INFL                             0.0891*** 0.0799** 0.0734** 0.0493* 0.0432* 0.0403 0.222* 0.214* 0.194 
                                 (2.66) (2.38) (2.26) (1.94) (1.68) (1.60) (1.81) (1.73) (1.61) 
GGDP                             -0.102 -0.0855 -0.0960 -0.0999 -0.0894 -0.0939 -0.277 -0.260 -0.295 
                                 (-0.93) (-0.79) (-0.85) (-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.93) (-1.05) 
HHI                              -0.0356 0.0131 0.0148 0.0293 0.0610 0.0619 -0.297 -0.250 -0.249 
                                 (-0.30) (0.10) (0.11) (0.37) (0.69) (0.70) (-0.62) (-0.50) (-0.50) 
GDP                              0.0129 -0.0195 0.00360 0.0566 0.0385 0.0498 -0.0700 -0.114 -0.0699 
                                 (0.19) (-0.26) (0.04) (1.13) (0.69) (0.81) (-0.37) (-0.60) (-0.36) 
Constant                         -0.771 -0.0217 -0.582 -1.746 -1.329 -1.604 0.729 1.750 0.680 
                                 (-0.41) (-0.01) (-0.26) (-1.30) (-0.88) (-0.99) (0.15) (0.37) (0.14) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                                381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 
R-squared                           0.09 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Note: This table is estimation results from equation (1) using fixed-effect method. Please see Table 1 for the description of variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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We now switch to the control variables. We do not find any significant impact of bank-
level characteristics. Regarding macroeconomic controls, we find a positive and significant 
impact of inflation.  
 
5. Further analysis 
5.1. The link between SSB and BOD 
In most cases, SSB members are appointed by the BOD and remunerated by the banks, 
causing a conflict of interest between them (Ginena and Hamid, 2015; Grais and Pellegrini, 
2006; Hamza, 2013; Oseni et al., 2016). Therefore, even though they are expected to play an 
independent role, SSB members behavior could be influenced by the BOD. While SSB 
members are encouraged to promote Islamic values through equity financing, the BOD might 
prefer to use markup or non-PLS contracts which are less risky and easier to implement. In 
other words, SSB decision to promote equity financing could be impacted by the characteristics 
of the BOD. To investigate this issue, we construct the following interaction model. 
 
𝐸𝑞𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                     (2) 
 
Where BOD is a vector of four variables: the number of directors in the board 
(Size_BODit), the duality of directors (Duality_BODit), the number of meetings held by the 
board in one financial year (Meeting_BODit), and the independence of directors (Indep_BODit). 
Specifically, Size_BOD, Indep_BOD, and Meeting_BOD are dummy variables equals to 1 if 
they are above their mean and 0 otherwise. Duality_BOD is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a 
CEO is also sit in the BOD.  
While there is few literature examine the impact of BOD on equity financing, large 
studies highlight how BOD structure affect firm performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Chou 
et al., 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Vallascas et al., 2017; Yang and Zhao, 2014). Taking from these 
results and applied on the link between BOD characteristic and equity financing, we could also 
expect that larger BOD could give a positive impact on equity financing because they have 
more people to give different perspectives about such mode of financing. The presence of 
independent BOD member should also positively impact on the PLS activities because 
independent members are less beholden to management. Higher meeting attendance by the 
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directors could also increase PLS financing activities because failure to regularly attend board 
meeting could be seen as directors’ unwillingness to fulfill his/her monitoring and supervising 
duties. The duality of CEO could negatively impact with equity financing as he or she has more 
significant influence over bank decision making. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for equation (2).  Whereas in the baseline 
regression we do not find significant impact of the size of SSB, from columns (1), (2), and (3), 
we could see that size of SSB matters especially when BOD size is small, when Islamic banks 
have duality structure of BOD, or when Islamic banks have frequent BOD meetings. We do 
not find any significant impact of SSB duality when BOD size is small (column (6)) and when 
BOD has a high number of the meeting (column (7)). The negative effect of Shariah department 
diminishes when BOD size is large (column (9)), but it still consistently shows negative impact 
regardless other BOD characteristics (columns (10), (11), and (12)). Our empirical results in 
overall suggest that the impact of SSB on PLS activities in Islamic banks is also affected by 
some of the characteristics of BOD. Although SSB is supposed to be entirely independent, in 
reality it seems to be difficult because they are appointed and remunerated by the banks. 
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Table 4. The interaction of SSB and BOD 
                                 ‘BOD’ = 
                                 
Number_ 
BOD                      
Duality_ 
BOD                    
Meetings 
BOD                   
Indep_ 
BOD                
Number_ 
BOD                      
Duality_ 
BOD                    
Meeting_ 
BOD                   
Indep_ 
BOD                
Number_ 
BOD                      
Duality_ 
BOD                    
Meeting_ 
BOD                   
Indep_ 
BOD                
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Size_SSB (β1)                    0.0432* 0.0324* 0.0576* 0.0191         
                                 (1.71) (1.72) (1.81) (1.65)         
Duality_SSB (β1)                       0.0377 0.0803*** 0.131** 0.0660***     
                                     (1.64) (2.83) (2.25) (2.71)     
ShariahDept_SSB (β1)                        -0.0890*** -0.0889*** -0.0906*** -0.0854*** 
                                         (-4.67) (-4.60) (-4.34) (-4.24) 
‘BOD' (β2) 0.0291 0.0178 0.0307* -0.0569 0.00507 0.0123 0.0172* -0.0106 0.00156 0.0129 0.00123 -0.00462 
                                 (1.17) (1.17) (1.70) (-1.41) (0.39) (0.84) (1.74) (-0.73) (0.22) (1.35) (0.17) (-0.37) 
Size_SSB*'BOD'  -0.0248 -0.00161 -0.0398 0.0621         
         (β1*β2)                          (-0.96) (-0.05) (-1.16) (1.49)         
Duality_SSB*'BOD'      0.0714** -0.00712 -0.144** 0.0101     
         (β1*β2)            (2.01) (-0.22) (-2.37) (0.25)     
ShariahDept_SSB*'BOD'          0.0423 -0.0164 0.0470** 0.0123 
         (β1*β2)         (1.19) (-0.80) (2.52) (0.89) 
Constant                         -0.381 -0.877 1.315 2.222 -0.292 -0.0438 -0.115 0.867 -0.610 -0.656 0.0159 0.371 
                                 (-0.21) (-0.47) (0.58) (1.16) (-0.14) (-0.02) (-0.04) (0.32) (-0.27) (-0.28) (0.00) (0.12) 
Wald test             
1. β1 + (β1*β2) 0.0184 0.0308 0.0178 0.0812** 0.109*** 0.0731* -0.0132 0.0760* -0.0467 -0.105*** -0.0436*** -0.0731*** 
 (0.87) (1.04) (1.35) (2.00) (2.92) (1.60) (-0.75) (1.46) (-1.52) (-3.39) (-4.15) (-4.36) 
2. β2 + (β1*β2) 0.00428 0.0162 -0.00905 0.00519 0.0765** 0.0052 -0.127** -0.0005 0.0438 -0.00355 0.0482*** 0.00769 
 (0.45) (0.58) (-0.43) (0.52) (2.12) (0.19) (-2.10) (-0.01) (1.27) (-0.20) (2.88) (1.57) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N obs.                                381 381 282 303 381 381 282 303 381 381 282 303 
N banks                                83 83 61 65 83 83 61 65 83 83 61 65 
R-sq.                             0.11 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 
Note: This table is estimation results from equation (2) using fixed-effect method. Please see Table 1 for the description of variables. Bank-level and country level controls are not shown to save space. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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5.2. SSB and institutional and Islamic environments 
Equity financing is not widely used among Islamic banks nowadays because of its 
complexity and risk. Equity financing even becomes less prevalent because many countries 
where Islamic banks operate are characterized by a high degree of market imperfection. In such 
environments, Islamic banks are not able to take an optimal financing decision due to 
asymmetric information and a strong moral hazard problem (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014; 
Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Alam and Parinduri (2017) therefore argue that under better 
institutional environments, equity financing could be more applicable. To examine this issue, 
we use the following specification: 
𝐸𝑞𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.          (3) 
where Environment is either institutional environment (InstEnv) or Islamic environment 
(IslamicEnv). To capture the different dimension of the institutional environment, we follow 
Alam and Parinduri (2017) and use four proxies from the doing business index (World Bank, 
2017). Those are resolving insolvency (ResInsovit), getting credit (GetCreditit), enforcing a 
contract (EnfContractit), and starting a business (StartBussit). Resolving insolvency is an index 
associated with the time, cost, outcome, and recovery rate for a commercial insolvency and the 
strength of legal framework for insolvency. Getting credit is an index which relates to movable 
collateral laws and credit information systems. The Enforcing contract index relates to the time 
and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and the quality of judicial processes. Starting a 
business is an index associated with the procedures, time, cost and minimum paid-in capital to 
start a limited liability company. All of the index ranges from 0-100 with the higher value 
indicates better institutional environment. In this study, we convert those measurements to the 
dummy variables to the ease of interpretation: 1 if the value of the index above its mean and 0 
otherwise. 
Regarding Islamic environment, we follow Abedifar et al. (2016) and Meslier et al. 
(2017) by using the market share of Islamic banks (ShareIB) and the percentage of Muslims in 
the country (MPOP). Similar to the institutional environment, we also convert ShareIB and 
MPOP into dummy variables. The value of 1 of ShareIB or MPOP indicates better Islamic 
environment (having greater Islamic banks market share or higher share of Muslims) whereas 
0 indicate poor Islamic environment. 
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The results for the impact of the institutional environment are presented in Table 5 
whereas Islamic environment is depicted in table 6. We find evidence that institutional 
environment characteristics significantly alter the influence of Shariah board on equity 
financing.  While in countries with a weaker institutional environment, size of SSB does not 
significantly affect PLS financing (β1 is not significant), we find a positive influence in 
countries with a better institutional environment (β1 + (β1*β2)). We further find that institutional 
environment significantly alters the influence of SSB duality on equity financing. We find 
negative effects of the coefficient of the interactive term (β1*β2), indicating that the positive 
effect of SSB duality on equity financing is reduced when the institutional environment is 
getting better. Through the duality of its members, SSB could act as a substitute to a weak 
institutional environment to influence the decision of bank’s manager to use PLS financing by 
providing monitoring and advisory activities, leading to a reduction of asymmetric information 
problems. We do not find any significant impact of institutional environment on the role of 
Shariah department.  
Regarding Islamic environment, Table 6 shows that the role of SSB size and SSB 
duality on equity financing are reduced in countries with a high market share of Islamic banks 
(β1*β2 is negative and significant). While we find a positive of SSB size column (1) and of SSB 
duality column (2) on equity financing in countries with a weaker Islamic environment, this 
effect turns to be negative when Islamic environment becomes stronger. Again, similarly to 
our previous findings, this might indicate that SSB presence acts as a substitute to a weak 
Islamic environment. In other words, when the Islamic environment is stronger, through either 
a higher share of Muslim population or a higher share of Islamic banks, there is less need to 
convince bank’s manager to use PLS activities in Islamic banks, reducing the positive impact 
of SSB duality. Our overall results therefore are not in line with (Alam and Parinduri, 2017) 
findings. Whereas they do not find a significant impact of institutional environment, our 
empirical results show that equity financing in Islamic banks could be altered by the condition 
of institutional and Islamic environments. We also show that better environments play a 
substitute role for SSB regarding its association with Islamic banks’ PLS lending activities. 
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Table 5. The SSB and institutional environments 
 
                                 ‘InstEnv’ = 
                                 ResInsolv GetCredit EnfContract StartBuss ResInsolv GetCredit EnfContract StartBuss ResInsolv GetCredit EnfContract StartBuss 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Size_SSB (β1) 0.0174 0.00192 0.00664 0.0354         
                                 (0.55) (0.07) (0.12) (0.79)         
Duality_SSB (β1)                         0.113*** 0.151*** 0.139*** 0.123***     
                                     (2.81) (3.61) (3.43) (2.97)     
ShariahDept_SSB (β1)                            -0.088*** -0.0673** -0.090*** -0.092*** 
                                         (-4.71) (-2.16) (-4.62) (-4.57) 
‘InstEnv’ (β2)      -0.0157 -0.0258 -0.0461 -0.0192 -0.00466 -0.00377 -0.0123 -0.0104 -0.00790 -0.00169 -0.0376** -0.00521 
                                 (-0.67) (-1.54) (-1.37) (-0.90) (-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.62) (-0.86) (-0.50) (-0.16) (-2.34) (-0.40) 
Size_SSB x InstEnv’ (β1*β2)          0.0172 0.0405 0.0266 -0.0055         
                                 (0.57) (1.39) (0.53) (-0.15)         
Duality_SSB x InstEnv’ 
(β1*β2)        -0.039*** -0.102** -0.0890** -0.0672*     
                                     (-2.85) (-2.17) (-2.12) (-1.75)     
ShariahDept_SSB x InstEnv’ 
(β1*β2)                  0.000764 -0.0231 0.00500 -0.0267 
                                         (0.04) (-1.09) (0.22) (-1.10) 
Constant                         -0.290 0.468 -0.464 -0.564 0.0685 -0.520 -0.204 -0.148 -0.505 -0.387 -0.322 -0.434 
                                 (-0.15) (0.24) (-0.26) (-0.30) (0.03) (-0.26) (-0.10) (-0.07) (-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.20) 
Wald test             
β1 + (β1*β2) 0.0346* 0.0424** 0.0332* 0.0299 0.0742* 0.0488* 0.0501* 0.0555* -0.087*** -0.090*** -0.085*** -0.068*** 
 (1.77) (2.09) (1.84) (1.59) (1.90) (1.74) (1.85) (1.96) (-2.97) (-4.61) (-3.05) (-2.72) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N obs.                                381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 
N banks                                83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Note: This table is estimation results from equation (2) using fixed-effect method. Please see Table 1 for the description of variables. Bank-level and country level controls are not shown to save space. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 6. The SSB and Islamic environments 
 
                                 ‘IslamicEnv’ = 
                                 ShareIB MPOP ShareIB MPOP ShareIB MPOP 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size_SSB (β1) 0.0389** 0.0473**     
                                 (2.23) (2.37)     
Duality_SSB (β1)                       0.0643* 0.0704*   
                                   (1.66) (1.80)   
ShariahDept_SSB (β1)                         -0.0299* 0.0462 
                                     (-1.71) (1.37) 
‘IslamicEnv’ (β2)          0.280*** 0.167*** 0.0867 0.139*** 0.100 0.166*** 
                                 (3.72) (3.34) (1.33) (3.16) (1.16) (3.29) 
Size_SSB * ‘IslamicEnv’ (β1*β2)          -0.344*** -0.112**     
                                 (-8.14) (-2.08)     
Duality_SSB * ‘IslamicEnv’’ (β1*β2)      -0.150** -0.199***   
                                   (-2.01) (-3.09)   
ShariahDept_SSB * ‘IslamicEnv’’ (β1*β2)             -0.0821 -0.132*** 
                                     (-0.75) (-2.74) 
Lag ROA                            -0.0488 -0.104 0.0987 0.0381 0.0385 0.00848 
                                 (-0.17) (-0.37) (0.43) (0.17) (0.13) (0.03) 
Lag EQTA                           -0.0698 -0.0778 -0.0558 -0.0354 -0.0565 -0.0306 
                                 (-1.10) (-1.24) (-0.90) (-0.59) (-0.90) (-0.51) 
Lag LLP                            0.000851 0.0449 0.0485 0.0680 0.0236 0.0538 
                                 (0.01) (0.47) (0.60) (0.82) (0.25) (0.54) 
Size                             0.000362 0.0136 0.00632 0.0159 0.00870 0.0179 
                                 (0.03) (1.03) (0.45) (1.06) (0.62) (1.22) 
INFL                             0.0762** 0.0796** 0.0720** 0.0684** 0.0702** 0.0587* 
                                 (2.46) (2.42) (2.31) (2.19) (2.28) (1.95) 
GGDP                             -0.134 -0.114 -0.104 -0.105 -0.105 -0.112 
                                 (-1.25) (-1.05) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-1.02) 
HHI                              -0.0371 0.00716 -0.0187 0.00895 -0.0338 0.0295 
                                 (-0.42) (0.08) (-0.17) (0.09) (-0.31) (0.28) 
GDP                              0.0242 0.0214 0.0237 0.0227 0.0204 0.0265 
                                 (1.53) (1.34) (1.43) (1.48) (1.23) (1.54) 
Constant                         -0.548 -0.712 -0.612 -0.770 -0.543 -0.910* 
                                 (-1.25) (-1.47) (-1.34) (-1.55) (-1.16) (-1.69) 
Wald test       
1. β1 + (β1*β2) -0.305*** -0.0643 -0.0852 -0.128*** -0.112 -0.087*** 
 (-8.03) (-1.30) (-1.40) (-2.99) (-1.07) (-2.94) 
2. β2 + (β1*β2) -0.0638 0.0552 -0.0628*** -0.0602* 0.0181 0.0343 
 (-1.54) (1.19) (-1.02) (-0.97) (0.27) (0.77) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N obs.                                381 381 381 381 381 381 
N banks                                83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-sq.                             0.21 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Note: This table is estimation results from equation (3) using random-effect method. Please see Table 1 for the description of 
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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6. Robustness checks 
We employ several robustness tests to test the consistency of our results. First, we 
replace our bank-fundamental variables by other indicators in our model specification. We do 
this because all of our bank-level controls are statistically insignificant. Table 7 shows the 
results. In columns (1)-(3) we replace ROA by ROE (return on equity, net income scaled by 
total equity) but the results remain same. ROE as another proxy for profitability does not show 
a significant impact. We replace EQTA by ZROA in the next analysis. ZROA is the Z-score of 
ROA, measuring the probability of banks’ insolvency. Following Fu et al. (2014), it is 
calculated as Zit = (ROAit + EQTAit)/σROA. Z-Score shows the number of standard deviation 
that banks’ return has to fall below its expected value to deplete equity and make the bank 
insolvent. Our results in column (4)-(6)  remain the same, suggesting that equity financing is 
not statistically affected by Islamic banks’ insolvency risk. The remaining columns show 
results when we change the proxy for credit risk. Instead of using LLP, we use a ratio of loan 
loss reserve to total loan (LLR). Again, we do not find statistically significant results when 
LLP is replaced by LLR. Equity financing is actually not affected by Islamic banks' financials. 
In all our alternative specifications, the significance of the SSB governance variables is 
unaltered.  
Second, we consider the degree of competition in the Islamic banking market by 
including a Lerner index in our model. As emphasized earlier from Table 2, some countries 
exhibit a considerable ratio of equity financing (Indonesia, Iran, Yemen) whereas it is very low 
in other countries (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). How Islamic banks compete with each other 
could also impact PLS financing. An Islamic bank might decide to employ PLS financing when 
there is a high degree of market competition on the Islamic banking market. We follow Meslier 
et al. (2017) by creating a Lerner index within the Islamic banking market (LernerIB). A Higher 
index indicates lower market competition and vice versa. Our result in Table 8, columns (1)-
(3), show that LernerIB negatively influences equity financing, meaning that higher Islamic 
banking market competition (Lower LernerIB) is associated with a higher ratio of equity 
financing, consistent with our prediction. After incorporating LernerIB in the equation, our 
results generally do not change. Even though we lost significance for Duality_SSB, it still has 
a positive value. ShariahDept_SSB is also significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 7. Robustness: Changing bank-fundamental control variables 
 
 EqFinTL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Size_SSB 0.0300   0.0304   0.0246   
 (1.53)   (1.53)   (1.23)   
Duality_SSB  0.0753*   0.0747*   0.0423*  
  (1.88)   (1.87)   (1.74)  
ShariahDept_SSB   -0.0869***   -0.0893***   -0.0841*** 
   (-4.51)   (-4.63)   (-4.30) 
Lag ROE 0.0165 0.0230 0.0124       
 (0.56) (0.84) (0.42)       
Lag LnZROA    -0.0104 -0.00683 -0.00733    
    (-0.72) (-0.49) (-0.53)    
Lag LLR       -0.0472 -0.0229 -0.0261 
       (-1.17) (-0.73) (-0.82) 
Lag EQTA -0.0319 -0.00670 -0.00856    -0.0186 -0.00705 -0.00617 
 (-0.47) (-0.10) (-0.13)    (-0.25) (-0.10) (-0.08) 
Lag LLP 0.0913 0.107 0.0877 0.0660 0.0938 0.0683    
 (1.02) (1.33) (0.99) (0.50) (0.85) (0.52)    
L.ROA    -0.0527 0.0108 -0.0466 -0.0688 -0.0193 -0.0205 
    (-0.13) (0.03) (-0.12) (-0.51) (-0.16) (-0.17) 
Constant -0.870 -0.0634 -0.663 -0.897 -0.196 -0.765 -0.795 -0.332 -0.755 
 (-0.48) (-0.03) (-0.30) (-0.44) (-0.09) (-0.32) (-0.42) (-0.16) (-0.34) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N obs. 381 381 381 378 378 378 370 370 370 
N banks 83 83 83 82 82 82 81 81 81 
R-sq. 0.094 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Note: This table is robustness test results from equation (1) using fixed-effect method. Please see Table 1 for the description of variables. Robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 8. Robustness: Islamic banking market competition, country fixed effect, and random effect technique 
 
 EqFinTL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Size_SSB 0.0268   0.0303   0.0244   
 (1.19)   (1.53)   (1.26)   
Duality_SSB  0.0375   0.0747*   0.0617  
  (1.07)   (1.90)   (1.61)  
ShariahDept_SSB   -0.0542**   -0.0890***   -0.0437** 
   (-2.60)   (-4.61)   (-2.40) 
LernerIB -0.102** -0.101* -0.0953*       
 (-2.29) (-1.87) (-1.87)       
Constant 0.304 0.812 0.584 -0.769 -0.0230 -0.583 -0.525 -0.560 -0.422 
 (0.17) (0.42) (0.29) (-0.41) (-0.01) (-0.26) (-1.15) (-1.25) (-0.95) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N obs. 312 312 312 381 381 381 381 381 381 
N banks 73 73 73 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-sq. 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.06 
Note: This table is robustness test results from equation (1) using fixed-effect method for column (1)-(3) and random-effect method for column (4)-(9). Please see 
Table 1 for the description of variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Third, we consider country fixed effects because PLS financing might be dependent on 
the country characteristics that cannot be captured by country-level variables in our equation. 
Results from columns (4)-(6) in Table 8 show that using country fixed effects in the estimations 
do not change the results. Fourth, we estimate our model by using random effects instead of 
fixed effects. Some papers in the area of bank governance prefer the former (Mollah et al., 
2016; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). One of the reasons is that because governance variables are 
rarely changing over time, the fixed effect technique could be inappropriate (Abdullah et al., 
2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). However, even when employing random-effect estimators, 
our results remain consistent, as depicted in columns (7) to (9). 
 
7. Conclusion 
After more than three decades of Islamic banking, the risk sharing features of equity 
financing is not successfully applied in Islamic banking activities. Due to its complexity, 
Islamic financing with risk-sharing features is rarely used in practice. This study investigates 
some potential drivers of equity financing.  We focus on the role of the SSB because this board 
is not just supervising the Shariah practices in Islamic banking but also advising the BOD and 
management on how Islamic banks can contribute to economic development and promote the 
core values of Islamic banking. These can be accomplished by using equity financing and 
limiting mark-up financing. 
We find that the extent to which equity financing actually used by Islamic banks is not 
affected by the size of SSB. We also find that duality of SSB is positively associated with 
equity financing. A member of the SSB who also sits on the BOD might have a greater power 
to influence policies and decisions in the bank particularly regarding the use or not of equity 
financing. We also find that the existence of Shariah department decreases the use of equity 
financing. Because Shariah department members are appointed by the bank’s manager, they 
might be less independent from the board. Moreover, they are subject to fatwa risk. 
Additionally, we also show that the institutional and Islamic environments matter for equity 
financing in Islamic banks.  
This study has two important policy implications. First, regulator and supervisor should 
carefully monitor the use of PLS in Islamic banks’ activities because of the risks and 
complexities inherent in this contract. The failure of the use of equity financing could increase 
the Islamic banks’ financial instability because Islamic banks might be willing to use PLS 
contract to attract more customers especially in the competitive market. Second, we suggest 
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SSB be integrated within BOD as we find that the SSB will have a better influence if they also 
hold a position in BOD. In fact, although the SSB has a role to monitor and advising Shariah 
issue in Islamic banks, the responsibility of Shariah applications are in the hand of BOD and 
management. Therefore, if SSB is united with BOD, SSB could also have responsibility and 
not just provide Shariah monitoring. The authority to give independent Shariah report and 
review could be moved into a country-level organization (central bank, financial service 
authority) or even private institution as applied in some countries. 
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General conclusion 
 
 
The substantial increase of Islamic finance both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries 
over the last decade has raised important issues on competition and governance. In most of 
countries, with the exception of Iran and Sudan, Islamic and conventional banks operate 
alongside on dual banking markets. This dissertation contains three chapters that mainly focus 
on the competitive behavior in the dual banking market. The first chapter studies how 
competition shapes the deposit behavior, the second chapter highlights the impact of 
competition on banking stability, and the third chapter focuses on Islamic banks’ equity 
financing activities. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, we investigate the impact of dual market 
competition and focus on the differences in deposit rate setting in Islamic and conventional 
banks. Islamic banks, in theory, have a different mechanism of setting the rate of deposit than 
its conventional peers. As Islamic banks follow the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) principle, 
Islamic depositors cannot claim a fixed rate of return on their deposits and the rate depend on 
the bank's actual ex-post profit. We show that there are notable differences in the determinants 
of deposit rates in the two types of institution. Market competition has a significant impact on 
deposit rate of conventional banks but not Islamic banks. This suggests that Islamic banks’ 
deposit rate setting is not affected by market competition, differently from conventional banks 
that increase (decrease) the rate when the market competitiveness higher (lower). Also, in 
countries with a greater presence of Islamic banks, conventional banks set higher rate and even 
higher when their market power is lower. A similar result is also observed from countries with 
a predominantly Muslim population. In this type of market, Islamic banks possibly have 
advantages compared to their conventional peers. Oppositely, conventional banks might face 
difficulties to attract depositors. Our result, in general, suggests that although many studies 
show the mimicking behavior of Islamic banks deposit, the way Islamic banks sets their deposit 
is different from their conventional counterparts. Although Islamic banks’ deposit seems to be 
similar than conventional banks, their determinants are different. 
In the second chapter, we continue our investigations by looking at the competition-
stability issue. Does competition between Islamic and conventional banks increase banks’ 
stability or fragility? Does the heightened competitive pressure in the dual market encourage 
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Islamic and conventional banks’ willingness to take the excessive risk? Our main finding 
supports ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis. Higher competition in dual banking market is not 
beneficial for banks’ stability. In the dual banking markets, Islamic banks have to compete with 
both Islamic and conventional banks. Likewise, conventional banks also compete with their 
conventional and Islamic peers. This condition implies that the degree of competition in dual 
banking market has been relatively high. Nevertheless, our result does not hold when we split 
our sample. We find that market competition only matters for conventional banks. Islamic 
banks’ stability is not affected by competitive pressure in the dual market. This result is also in 
line with what we find in the first chapter. However, even though competition erodes 
conventional banks’ stability, our analysis also shows that it could be also beneficial for them 
when the degree of competition is either low or medium. 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, we focus on the way Islamic banks’ lending 
activities are influenced by bank’s governance, issues which under-explored in the literature 
We analyze the role of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) on banks’ PLS or equity financing. 
SSB, in theory, should have more rules than supervising because Islamic banks is a part of 
Islamic economics. In this sense, SSB should promote ethical behavior in Islamic banks by 
adopting PLS mechanism. To do this, we use a hand-collected data on equity financing and 
governance characteristics we obtained from annual reports and combined it with the data from 
BankScope and other sources. Our baseline result shows that Islamic banks’ equity financing 
is influenced by some characteristics of SSB. SSB duality, or the presence of SSB member in 
the BOD or executive member, have a positive impact on equity financing. By having a dual 
position, SSB is closer to BOD, and therefore SSB could have a greater power to influence 
final Islamic banking decisions particularly regarding the use or not of equity financing. We 
also observe that the existence of a Shariah department in Islamic banks decreases the 
proportion of equity financing. This might be because Shariah department members are hired 
by the banks as other employees. Thus it might be difficult for them to provide independent 
reviews on Shariah-related matters. Another finding we obtain in this chapter is that equity 
financing is affected by institutional and Islamic environment. SSB’s impact is reduced in the 
better banking environment, suggesting a substitution role between SSB and the banking 
environments. 
Our findings have important policy implications for the future of Islamic banking. First, 
our result suggests that the degree of competition in the dual market could turn to a destructive 
competition that therefore jeopardizes Islamic and conventional banks’ stability. Hence, 
regulators and supervisors should carefully monitor the price-setting behavior in the dual 
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market. Second, besides increasing role of regulators and supervisors to monitor dual market 
competition, it might be necessary for each country adopting dual banking system to establish 
an institution specifically focus on Islamic banking development. This institution might help 
regulators to create conditions for Islamic banks to act as a complement to conventional banks 
in order to promote greater financial inclusion. Third, regulators should develop specific rules 
and practical guidance regarding equity financing. This is because even though this mode of 
finance is believed to be a backbone of Islamic finance, the application is difficult, and it could 
even harm Islamic banks’ financial condition. Fourth, we suggest no separation between BOD 
and SSB, as we find that the duality of SSB could increase PLS financing activities. The 
country-level organization such as central bank or financial service authority or private 
institution could also replace the SSB’s role in giving independent Shariah review to the bank. 
We suggest some directions for further research. First, in the first and second chapter, 
we evaluate how competition affect deposit rate setting and financial stability of Islamic banks 
vis-à-vis conventional banks whereas in the third chapter we study Islamic banks in the more 
detailed perspective. Therefore, we suggest to further explore Islamic banks’ behavior and 
characteristics, such as their governance structure or their equity financing as we have done in 
the third chapter, rather than comparing performance and stability between Islamic banks and 
their conventional rivals that has been addressed in many prior studies. Second, if we want to 
focus specifically on Islamic banking research, we should also consider the unique datasets 
which could be obtained from hand-collecting processes and survey. Managing this kind of 
data might not be easy and need a lot of time but the result will significantly contribute to the 
development of Islamic banking literature because a unique dataset has a potential to answer 
some specific research questions that cannot be addressed using the widely-used database. 
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Abstract 
 
This dissertation highlights three important issues in Islamic banks. In the first chapter, we 
investigate the impact of dual market competition on the differences in deposit rate setting in 
Islamic and conventional banks. We show that there are notable differences in the determinants 
of deposit rates in the two types of institution. Market competition has a significant impact on 
deposit rate of conventional banks but not Islamic banks. Our result, in general, suggests that 
although Islamic banks’ deposit seems to be similar than conventional banks, their 
determinants are different. In the second chapter, we continue our investigations by looking at 
the competition-stability issue. Does competition between Islamic and conventional banks 
increase banks’ stability or fragility? Our main finding suggests that competitive dual banking 
market is not beneficial for banks’ stability. In line with the result from the first chapter, in the 
next investigation, dual market competition only matters for conventional banks. In the third 
chapter of this dissertation, we analyze the role of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) on banks’ 
equity financing. Our result shows that Islamic banks’ equity financing is influenced by some 
characteristics of SSB. The presence of SSB member in the Board of Directors (BOD) or 
executive member has a positive impact on equity financing whereas the existence of a Shariah 
department in Islamic banks decreases the proportion of equity financing. 
 
Keywords: Islamic banks, competition, deposit, stability, equity financing, Shariah supervisory 
board 
 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Cette thèse met en lumière trois questions importantes au regard des banques Islamiques. Dans 
le premier chapitre, nous examinons l'impact de la concurrence sur les différences de fixation 
des taux de dépôt dans les banques Islamiques et conventionnelles. Nous montrons qu'il existe 
des différences notables dans les déterminants des taux de dépôt dans les deux types 
d'institutions. La concurrence du marché a un impact significatif sur le taux de dépôt des 
banques conventionnelles mais pas des banques Islamiques. Notre résultat, en général, suggère 
que bien que le dépôt des banques Islamiques semble être similaire à celui des banques 
conventionnelles, leurs déterminants sont différents. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous 
poursuivons nos enquêtes en examinant la question de la concurrence et de la stabilité. La 
concurrence entre banques Islamiques et conventionnelles augmente-t-elle la stabilité ou la 
fragilité des banques ? Notre principale constatation suggère que le marché concurrentiel des 
deux banques n'est pas bénéfique pour la stabilité des banques. Conformément au résultat du 
premier chapitre, lors de la prochaine enquête, la concurrence sur deux marchés ne concerne 
que les banques conventionnelles. Dans le troisième chapitre de cette dissertation, nous 
analysons le rôle du Conseil de surveillance de la Charia sur le financement par capitaux 
propres des banques. Notre résultat montre que le financement par capitaux propres des 
banques Islamiques est influencé par certaines caractéristiques de la Conseil de surveillance de 
la Charia. La présence d'un membre de la Conseil de surveillance de la Charia au Conseil 
d'administration ou d'un membre de l'exécutif a un impact positif sur le financement par actions 
tandis que l'existence d'un département de la Charia dans les banques Islamiques diminue la 
proportion de financement par capitaux propres. 
 
Mots-clés : banques Islamiques, concurrence, dépôt, stabilité, financement par capitaux 
propres, Conseil de surveillance de la Charia 
